THE NEW REPUBLIC

Communist Disunity

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Nuclear Arms for NATO?

Robert Osgood

Kennedy's Trade Policy

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The Story of Madison

Sidney Hyman

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Just Below the Surface

★ There are about 1,000 voluntary organizations in the US today which may be called "rightist" and which regularly publish or distribute great quantities of right-wing literature. The South today is a particularly fertile field. Most intellectuals pooh-pooh such groups, exemplified by the rather amusing crackpot John Birch Society. The Public Affairs Press now publishes a pamphlet, "The American Right Wing," A Report to the Fund for the Republic, by Ralph Ellsworth and the late Dr. Sarah Harris, taking a graver view.

Why have both Eisenhower and Kennedy recently warned against the rising influence of the right wing? Its strength exists just below the surface, rarely finding direct expression in popular press or journals of scholarship and opinion. Few Americans and fewer foreigners are aware of their influence. And yet they are stubbornly dedicated, with membership reaching from coast-to-coast and from top to bottom of society. They are proud of their work and sincere in their advocacy. They have journals, newsletters, societies, blacklists, movies and funds. They have no one outstanding leader since McCarthy (unless it is Goldwater) but they sway all in unison to similar tides and emotions and bombard anxious Congressmen and timid publishers with tens of thousands of letters. The State University of Iowa Library has an extensive collection of this literature, much contributed by the publishers.

The present study is highly documented, slightly dull; a scholarly 60-page compendium of this powerful borderline political nexus. The right wing has not withered away since the censure of McCarthy. It opposes strong centralized government and all foreign entanglements. Its goals differ. Some feel the Federal income tax is "straight out of the Communist Manifesto"; some think fluoridation of drinking water is intended to medicate us into a nation of robots; some agree with the writer who declared "Foreign Aid Is Not Christian." J. Edgar Hoover, the authors say calmly, has "thoroughly identified his own political position with that of the Right." One group battles desegregation; another under Admiral John G. Crommelin fights the "Communist-Jewish Conspiracy"; another sees America undone by distribution of UNICEF Christmas cards.

This great house of ultra-conservatism is so diverse that it is difficult to know how to take it. Parts of it are highly respectable. The American Bar Association's Committee on Communist Tactics, reported to a London conference in 1957 that the Supreme Court was following the Communist line in at least 15 important decisions. The AMA has consistently held all social security is bad; in the words of a speaker at a recent convention it is "Part of a mad and unreasoning rush into the cold and leprous arms of the welfare-police-slave state."

The Idea of Conspiracy

★ These right wingers are not doubters – they Believe. "Many believe absolutely that this country is in the grip of a savage, ruthless and even supernatural conspiracy; that disciplined known men, not abstract nouns, are the foreign agents of this conspiracy. . . ." Again, the pamphlet observes, many hold "an almost mystical dependence on this idea of conspiracy to account for the miserable state of the world."

Is this amorphous right wing politically potent? Yes, in the opinion of TRB, it is; it cannot be laughed off. It operates as a reservoir in villages and suburbs for opposition to any forward movement; it is a spill-over of old-fashioned isolationism, a seeker of simple solutions, a believer in devils and conspiracies, a doubter of majority rule. It held the State Department captive under Truman, it was temporarily numbed under Eisenhower, and now it walks again goaded by fear. You will be interested in this pamphlet: Send $1 to Public Affairs Press, 419 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington 3, D. C.

Incidentally, *Time* magazine reports that in a recent Boston talk commentator-columnist Fulton Lewis Jr. (58) repudiated the Birchist line of merely impeaching Earl Warren and declared, amidst wild applause, "I would lynch Earl Warren."

Also, that when the DAR urged boycott of UNICEF Christmas cards (sold annually to help the world's hungry children) as part of a Red conspiracy to undermine religion and turn Christmas into a "One-World peace festival," Mrs. John F. Kennedy ordered 10 boxes of the cards starting such a run that some items are sold out.

The Current of Events

★ What was the most important event in 1961? Ask us again in 100 years and we'll answer more certainly. But perhaps it was Britain's decision to apply for Common Market membership. The second? – Kennedy's proposal for US partnership.

The development is so dazzling some writers have got ahead of themselves; Britain is not yet actually in the Common Market and Congress hasn't yet voted Kennedy tariff bargaining power (and very likely won't in the session ahead). But the current of events seems plain. The toughest hurdle of all, we guess, won't be over industry or wages, it will be farm products. Agriculture is up to its neck in politics in France and Europe generally as it is in the USA. Secretary Freeman went to France trying to get a promise that US farm products would be admitted to the Common Market for five years according to their historic ratio; he got nowhere. The US sends two billion dollars worth of farm products to Europe annually, buys only eighty million. Much of our exports are subsidized. We sell raw cotton abroad 25 percent lower than it sells at home, and when cheap cotton textiles come back, subsidize the faltering textile industry. The US consumer pays twice. The Common Market trade reshuffle could be the greatest in history. It will bring benefits – and anguish; personally we don't see how the US' gigantic screwball farm program can survive a more rational world distribution.

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Dodd's Private War

The adversaries of the UN and the US in the Congo are not without resources. They have money, they have mercenaries, they have the goodwill of the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – and they have Senator Dodd of Connecticut. They do not have President Kennedy. When he recalled Ambassador Timberlake from the Congo and replaced him with Edmund Gullion, the President resolved policy differences that had wracked the Administration for months. "The United States," UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson said last week, "is very pleased with the plan of the Secretary-General to bring Katanga under control." The plan also has the carping acquiescence of the Soviet Union, the opposition of the French and – only last week with its decision to release two dozen thousand-pound bombs for use by Indian Canberra bombers – the reluctant cooperation of the British.

Why are UN forces fighting in the Congo? Not simply to defend themselves – they could do that best by pulling out entirely. Nor are they there merely to maintain order – if that were so, the UN would be obliged to protect Katangan secessionists behind their wall. The UN is there because the member-states of the UN have agreed that if the territorial integrity of the nation is not restored, the results will be grievous for both Katanga and the Congo. Not only is the wealth of Katanga essential to the development of the whole country (nearly 40 percent of Congolese tax revenues and more than half its export earnings before independence came from Katanga), but a splitting away of Katanga would throw the rest of the Congo up for grabs. The scramble to pick up the pieces would mean new civil wars between rival leaders, tribes and ideologies and competition among the big powers for whatever might be salvaged.

The effort to reunify the country, while allowing considerable autonomy to the provinces, is resisted by Mr. Tshombe and his backers in the name of self-determination. Yet, as Ambassador Gullion said on December 3, if a plebiscite were held in the whole of Katanga, it is "doubtful" whether Tshombe could win it: "The northern part of his province is becoming unstuck. He is a minority leader of a minority part of a province. He controls perhaps 500,000 people in a province of 1.5 million, out of a total population in the Congo of some 14 million." But he has in his service mercenaries, "by and large freebooters [who] fight and kill for money." In recent days, Katangan forces have fought pitched battles against UN troops, shot at (from Mr. Tshombe's home) and damaged a US Air Force transport,

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placed the US Consul in Katanga under house-arrest and stoned the Consulate. Finally, according to the London *Observer's* African correspondent, Colin Legum, "Mr. Tshombe has privately tried to make a deal with Mr. Gizenga [no friend of the West or of Senator Dodd] against Mr. Adoula, and . . . the Katanga Government has threatened to ask Russia for help if it is 'abandoned' by its friends. To back up this threat it has already sent a delegation to Czechoslovakia to sound out the Russians."

"For whom," the Foreign Minister of the Congo asks, "are the Congolese of Katanga fighting, for whose benefit?" Mr. Tshombe's answer is their own freedom. But his strongest allies in this fight for "freedom" are the white supremacists of Africa and white investors in Katanga – British, French and Belgian – who fear that their valuable properties – above all, those of the *Union Miniere* – will be safer under Mr. Tshombe than under the central government of Mr. Adoula. In his defiance, Mr. Tshombe has also been encouraged, as is documented in the statement of the former head of the UN in Katanga, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, by important spokesmen for the British, French and Rhodesians. And by Senator Dodd, Katanga's best-known champion in the US. Mr. Tshombe "seriously wonders whether there are not Communists in the State Department" and charges that the "United Nations attack against my country [sic] . . . is aiding directly in the fulfillment of Soviet ambitions to enslave Central Africa. . . ." Senator Dodd echoes, at a press conference in Paris on December 7, that the UN policies "will, if pursued to their logical conclusion, turn the Congo over to Communist imperialism."

Mr. Dodd said this after having just come from Katanga where he conferred with Mr. Tshombe, and, to the embarrassment of his hosts, had narrowly escaped abduction by Katangan troops. He was there, according to the *New York Times*, in "a private capacity to inform himself on the situation there." That statement needs qualification. Mr. Dodd was not on business for the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is a member, but neither was he there "in a private capacity." His trip was authorized by Senator Eastland as Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee, of which Dodd is Vice Chairman. The connection between consulting Mr. Tshombe and the internal security of the US is explained by a spokesman for the Senator thus: "It is helpful in studying how Communism operates in this country to observe the techniques of Communist propaganda and infiltration, and the causing of riots and disturbances, in other parts of the world."

Like many politicians before him, Mr. Dodd is close to violating the seldom-enforced Logan Act, whose intent is to forbid just this kind of approach to foreign governments – "close to" it because the US does not recognize a government of Katanga. It's a free country, and none is so free as a Senator. But isn't there something questionable about a high-ranking public servant traveling on official business, the purpose of which is to undercut the official policy of his country?

Cuba's Neighbors

The most interesting facet of Fidel Castro's December 2 harangue on Cuban TV is not his full embrace of the Communist line – that had been foreshadowed – but the fact that the speech was not picked up in Moscow by *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and that the controversial second half was not printed in Havana. Most experts think Castro has been trying to prevent Moscow from abandoning him in a crisis by establishing himself in the public eye as Moscow's man, thus making Moscow's prestige and reliability depend in some measure on his survival. But if this were the case, why did he agree to the elimination of the more inopportune passages from the Havana press? Or has the Communist Party in Cuba so completely absorbed the evaporating "26th of July Movement," so completely consolidated its position that it can defy Castro on such a sensitive issue as his own speeches? When he says, "We are much more revolutionary now than when we came to power," one wonders who is meant by "we"?

If Castro's personal rule is being replaced by Party rule, as he says it gradually will be, and as the censorship incident suggests, what effect will this have on "the Cuban threat" to the hemisphere? Castro's confession that *fidelismo* leads logically to a Bolshevik-style dictatorship will certainly do much to disenchant Latin American liberals who share his nationalism and his passion for social justice. For most of them do not share his opinion that there is no half-way house between capitalism and Marxist-Leninist socialism, or that the Cuban example, "would work in all Latin America," or that "the USSR surpasses all nations in housing, in production, in low infant mortality, in longevity." So by the time the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States meet on January 10, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and perhaps even Mexico may feel that, like Venezuela, they can risk going along with US demands for condemnation of Castro. (The small Caribbean oligarchies, more directly threatened by Cuban backing of local revolutionaries, and less fearful of liberal opinion than the major South American democracies, have always gone along. With Venezuela and Colombia, these oligarchies provide the 14 votes out of 21 needed to adopt an OAS resolution. But a bare two-thirds vote would be a hollow victory.)

Whether OAS can topple Castro by condemning him

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(or by imposing sanctions, which are as yet a remote prospect) is doubtful. Ideological isolation and economic privation may help bring down a dictatorship when there is an appealing alternative, but that is not the case in Cuba today. Until an active and unsullied underground inside Cuba, not in exile, pushes the regime toward collapse, the OAS can do little more than pass resolutions.

Dance of the Three Princes

No sooner had US and Soviet delegates at Geneva hailed their provisional agreement on certain key terms of a Laotian settlement than the dispatches (diplomatic as well as journalistic) from Laos itself began to cast doubt on the actual prospects. The Geneva announcement on December 4 had raised hopes that the three-member International Control Commission charged with overseeing Laotian neutrality would be given operational powers and that the Communist member would not insist on thoroughgoing application of the *troika* principle. Formerly, the Polish member of the ICC had exercised a veto power over the Indian Chairman and the Canadian member. Inspection teams could not be dispatched to investigate armed clashes or charges of military airdrops unless all three Commission members concurred. Now any two of the three can act; and though the ICC cannot assert a violation of the cease-fire without unanimity, the findings of each of the countries' inspectors could be passed on to the 14 nations who would be signatories to a truce.

But the prospects for a treaty at Geneva continue to rest on the outcome of lackadaisical negotiations between the three contending Laotian politicians – Boun Oum (pro-West), Souvanna Phouma (neutralist) and Souphanouvong (pro-Communist). The protracted bargaining between them over the terms of a coalition regime has tested the patience of the great powers concerned (one top State Department official speaks privately of the negotiations as "The Dance of the Three Princes"). Nominally agreed on a coalition headed by Souvanna Phouma and an 8-4-4 allocation of Cabinet portfolios – eight neutralists chosen by the Premier, and slates of four left to Boun Oum and Souphanouvong – the princes are stalemated on the choice of a defense minister and the disposition of the Pathet Lao armed force of 8,000 men. Each side charges a secret military buildup on the part of the other. "Hostilities might resume at any time," warns Moscow Radio.

Some weeks ago it appeared that individual American military advisers in Vientiane might be encouraging Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan in their intransigence. More recently there has been evidence that the root of the difficulty lies in the recalcitrance of the pro-Chinese faction within the Pathet Lao. For it has grown increasingly clear that a neutralist coalition regime is the most that the US can hope to get in Laos and that Boun Oum is in no position to drive a hard bargain. The Kennedy Administration looks to a Souvanna Phouma regime to help seal off the passage of Communist guerrillas through the Laotian corridor from north to south Vietnam. If the coalition effort fails, the Pathet Lao would be free to resume its military offensive, and the overt use of Laos as a general staging area for the offensive against South Vietnam would pose an almost insoluble problem.

COMING: *Shelters and Survival – a special report on the civil defense muddle.*

Newspaper Monopolies

The case filed in the Federal District Court in Detroit by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, seeking to require the Ford Motor Company to divest itself of its last spring's purchase of the Electric Autolite Company, is perhaps the first evidence that this Administration is going to be more of a trust-buster than its predecessor. At the moment the box score, representing new and old business, in which the Antitrust Division has a direct or related interest stands as:

31 cases before the Supreme Court
75 cases in the Court of Appeals
150 District Court cases
60 presentations to grand juries
300-500 departmental investigations

But not all initiative in antitrust action starts in the Justice Department. Take the case of a local newspaper monopoly, often compounded by the newspaper's ownership of the local radio-TV station. A generation ago, when cross-country chains were being developed by Hearst, Scripps-Howard, and others, monopoly of news itself made news. Today, nationwide overlordships are on the decline. But there are local barons of local fiefs that are no less stoutly held. Current costs of publishing newspapers have induced local mergers and combinations until readers who do not have the stamina to go through the *New York Times* as a second

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paper have no choice of news sources in most places; and local advertising is a powerful lure. This, surely, is monopoly. Yet no administration, whether it expects much from him or not, likes to kill its standing with Santa Claus by an antitrust prosecution.

However, representatives of the thousand stockholders of the *Lima Citizen* of Lima, Ohio, have for several years persistently been asking for redress under the anti-monopoly laws. The background is this: In 1956, a chain known as "Freedom Newspapers" bought out the *Lima News*, and installed an editorial position far to the Right. Citizens with other opinions thereupon raised funds to start the *Lima Citizen*. The new paper offers competition both as a business and as a point of view. For its first two years, it lost money; since then it has managed to stay in the black, though by a very slender margin. Current circulation is 21,000-25,000; a high-speed press will widen its potential.

According to the *Citizen's* staff, the chain, intent on protecting its investment and monopoly position has been offering cut-rate advertising, give-aways ranging from autos to dishtowels, subscriptions and out-of-town motor deliveries at uneconomic rates which can only be supported by drawing on earnings from papers elsewhere in an effort to abolish competition in Lima. Is this in restraint of trade? So far, the Justice Division has done no more than listen to the *Citizen's* story.

Fraternity Ins and Outs

The Reverend James A. McInerney of De Paul University in Chicago made the headlines last week when he told the National Interfraternity Congress in Boston that fraternities are private organizations, based on congeniality rather than high principle, and that the current effort of many college administrations to open fraternities to Negroes and Jews is, by implication, an invasion of privacy. Since Father McInerney's sentiment is not confined either to Dominicans or Alpha Delta Pi's, it is worth pointing out that what most university authorities want is not to *compel* fraternities to accept members they don't like, but to *allow* them to accept members they do like. Many students in local fraternities and sororities would like to admit friends who are Negroes or Jews, but are forbidden to do so by national fraternity policies or by local constitutions which are extremely difficult to amend. The removal of these religious and racial bars is not an invasion of privacy but an effort to protect it – by insisting that the best judge of a man's fitness for membership in a fraternity are the students who will be living with him for the next four years, not some remote group of national officers who have never even met the individual in question.

They May Not Travel

In the landmark passport case of *Kent v Dulles*, the Supreme Court said and the government conceded that "the right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." Given the statute-law applicable in 1958, when this case was decided, the Court held that a passport could not be denied on the ground of a citizen's "adherence to the Communist Party line," or even on the ground of his membership in the Party.

Since then, however, the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 has become effective, having undergone an excruciating purgatory of litigation. This monument to the bitter ingenuity of the late Sen. Pat McCarran provides, among many, many other things, that once a "Communist-action organization" has been finally ordered by the Justice Department to register, no member may apply for a passport, and none may be issued to him. The mere making of an application will subject a member to heavy criminal penalties. Last spring, the Supreme Court held that the Communist Party is a "Communist-action organization" within the meaning of the statute, and that it may be ordered to register, which the Attorney General has now ordered it to do. And so the State Department, with the advice of Justice, is preparing to announce that it will issue no passports to members of the Party; they are, as far as these Departments are concerned, imprisoned in the Western Hemisphere.

It is extremely questionable, however, whether the right to travel may constitutionally be denied in this fashion. If the government is allowed to make a prison of this country, it ought to be required – and more than likely the Supreme Court would require it – to point to some specific aspect of the national interest which an individual's travel would or even might harm. Thus, no doubt, travel in furtherance of a conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States or to subvert its interests abroad could be forbidden. So also could travel undertaken in the course of espionage activities, or travel to flee from justice. But under the American Constitution such charges must be proved against an individual through a trial process of one sort or another before governmental action can be based on them. This at least was the pre-McCarran-McCarthy tradition. (Mere membership in the Communist Party is sufficient to exclude a person from certain kinds of employment, but that is not at issue here.) It is nonsense to presume that every Party member – and it will have to be an above-ground one, who is known to have retained his Party card – will under all circumstances always travel for subversive purposes. Don't they ever take vacations?

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THREE PARTIES SPEAKING WITH BUT A SINGLE VOICE

The Bundestag Debate on Berlin

Bonn

The Bundestag debate on December 6 and 7 showed conclusively how little scope West Germans would like to give President Kennedy and his allies for bargaining with the USSR. Speakers of the three political parties proclaimed, with the utmost fervor, the hardest of hard lines which ought to be followed over the Berlin question. They were loudly applauded (by members of their own parties only – but it is a West German tradition not to applaud a member of any other party but your own); no voice was raised in dissent. Only one man sat, most of the time resting his chin on the ball of his left thumb, brooding over the insight which he was given into President Kennedy's mind in Washington, over knowledge which he cannot disclose (or should not disclose) before a summit conference on Berlin is called in the New Year. And this man, Dr. Adenauer, did not utter a single word during the first, key day of the debate.

It was a key day because the spokesmen of the three parties – Willy Brandt for the Social Democrats, Heinrich von Brentano for the Christian Democrats, and Erich Mende for the Free Democrats – nailed their colors squarely to the mast. Their views on Berlin coincided to such a remarkable degree that they can be summarized as being the views of the 500 members of the Bundestag. The one possible exception was Adenauer himself, newly risen from a sick bed, less than a month away from his 86th birthday, waxen-faced and clearly feeling his age. In the last 12 years he has only once failed to mold the Bundestag to his way of thinking on an important issue (the Saar). Will he be able to bring the majority in the Bundestag round to his own view in 1962? Does he even want to? Or has "full agreement" with President Kennedy been announced as a diplomatic face-saver?

First, the views of the Bundestag on Berlin. Brandt, Brentano and Mende were unanimous on the following points. There shall be no "final" solution of the Berlin question, other than its restoration as the capital of a united Germany. At a summit conference on Berlin the purpose of the West must be to improve the status of West Berlin; the most immediate way in which that can be done is by removing the Communist wall through the city. The existing links between Berlin and the Federal Republic should not be weakened; above all, West Berlin should not be turned into some kind of "city state" (it has been widely rumored here that this is what President Kennedy wants). If there is any "interim arrangement" for Berlin it should be made clear that this must not stand in the way of reunification of Germany in freedom. Finally, any interim arrangement should include the maintenance of Allied military rights in West Berlin and Allied communications with West Germany. There shall be no recognition of the Ulbricht regime in the East German Republic, no recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's Eastern frontier.

In effect, the Bundestag gave Adenauer a mandate to be as tough as he wants to be – with his allies as well as the Soviet Union. It did this only a few days before he was due to meet General de Gaulle. And the Chancellor is theoretically committed to selling de Gaulle President Kennedy's views and obtaining the agreement of the French to a summit conference on Berlin. The Bundestag's mandate might be interpreted in these terms: Adenauer will not be blamed if he allows himself to be talked around by the French President and if he decides that General de Gaulle's argument is sound, and that talks with the Russians are purposeless unless the latter are ready to come to a "fair" agreement.

Of course, there are loopholes in this mandate. The chief one seems to be that an "interim arrangement" for Berlin can, as such, be accepted. The removal of the wall through Berlin is a demand, but it need not be regarded as an unconditional demand. The maintenance of Allied garrisons in Berlin and freedom of communications between Berlin and West Germany are regarded as vital by the whole Western Alliance, while the ideal of German reunification, with Berlin as the natural capital city, is merely desirable. But the big question remains – if the West is to secure guarantees for West Berlin, with some modification of its present status, are they to offer the Soviet Union nothing at all? The view of the Bundestag, and of the three political parties, is plain. The Soviet Union must be convinced that a reasonable interim agreement over Berlin will ease tensions which are more hurtful to the East German regime than to anyone else; witness the building of a Communist wall which is to a large extent a confession of Communist defeat.

This is a bold line, considering the exceptional vulnerability of West Berlin. The West German parties would back it up with forceful and imaginative diplomacy, aimed at securing German reunification and pro-

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ducing a counter-thrust to Soviet political pressure in Central Europe. The weird situation in Berlin and the manifest political and economic weaknesses of the Ulbricht regime could, they believe, offer a platform for Western diplomatic counter-pressure. Nor would it be wise to rule out the chances of such counter-pressure being successful – if Adenauer and Kennedy were really ready to discuss counter-pressure as well as concessions. But success would depend, it seems to me, on three conditions being fulfilled:

The Western Powers would have to accept German reunification as being an attainable and in the long run inevitable objective. The reason for this is that the Russians will never accept any "stalemate" resting on the existing division of Germany. The Ulbricht regime is likely to remain so shaky that it can only be safeguarded by further Communist advance into Western Germany (the first stage of such an advance would be the Communist capture of the whole of Berlin).

The Western Powers would have to pursue the objective of reunification tirelessly, imaginatively and unitedly. An objective is all very well, but there would have to be a policy for reaching it. Only the United States has the strength and authority to coordinate and implement such a policy.

The Western Powers would have to reactivate the arts of diplomacy. This may sound trite, but the Dulles view of brinkmanship – in which military force takes the place of logic – seems to die hard. The biggest lever which the West possesses in the German question is the unfreedom and unhappiness of the 17 million East Germans. Virtually no use whatever has been made of this lever so far.

On the face of it the Bundestag is in an intransigent mood. There is going to be no easy formula for finding agreement over Berlin, or Germany as a whole. The differences between East and West are too big to be papered over. If nothing else, the Bundestag has spoken with a single, clear voice. This may be inconvenient, but it cannot be overlooked. TERENCE PRITTIE

THE CASE FOR LOWER TARIFFS IS BEING EXAGGERATED

Kennedy's New Trade Policy

In a careful job of preparation, ranging from private briefings of the Washington pundits to strong words before the National Association of Manufacturers and the AFL-CIO last week, the Administration has built its case for passage of a more liberal tariff bill next year around the existence of the European Common Market. The case has three main elements:

1. The new common tariff around the Common Market threatens urgently needed American exports to Europe.

2. The common tariff is also causing, and threatens to cause even more, a flight of American firms to Europe to get inside the tariff wall. This means a direct loss of American jobs, as well as American exports.

3. It being thus essential to get the Common Market wall sharply lowered, Congress must give the President far more authority to reduce American tariffs, as a bargaining weapon. If he gets that authority, the vital interests of the United States can be protected.

There is something in all those three propositions. But alas, they paint a greatly oversimplified view. On the theory that truth – even painful truth – is more useful than fiction, let us look at them realistically.

Proposition One. The first thing to be said about the new Common Market tariff is that it is an average of the existing national tariffs. In this sense, it is scarcely a "new" barrier to American exports. For every Dutch or Belgian tariff that goes up against the US from former levels, a French or Italian tariff comes down. While it is true that in some cases we were able to sell before only in the low-tariff markets – markets where the tariff will now go up a little – it is also true that we will have a better chance than ever in the really big markets of France and Italy. Our exports to both countries have already improved enormously since the Common Market began.

Next, while averages are invariably deceptive in tariff matters, it remains a fair statement that the new common tariff as a whole is not strikingly high. It is seldom so high as to be prohibitive. This will be even more the case after the reduction of 20 percent in most items that will result from the current tariff bargaining in the GATT meetings at Geneva, in which the US has

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been using its present reciprocal trade law as a bargaining weapon with some success.

For some of our most important exports – cotton and steel scrap for example – the common tariff is zero. For numerous other important items it is quite low, 10 percent or less.

Third, and perhaps most important, the tariff is overrated in the public mind as a determinant of the flow of trade. No one knows this better than the American protectionists, who have increasingly turned toward quantitative restrictions as the only effective way of thwarting imports into the US. If an American produces a better machine, he will sell it in Europe regardless of a 10 or even a 20 percent tariff. In the age of complex technology, quality rather than cost is increasingly the problem. The tariff remains important for standard items like raw aluminum, woodpulp, many chemicals – items where price differences are the only differences. It is less and less important for the growing range of finished manufactures, from ready-made dresses to computers, where the US is strong.

What could be important, as noted, is quotas – quantitative restrictions on imports. But fortunately the Common Market, in practically eliminating quotas on non-farm goods, has extended this liberalization to outsiders, including the US. That is one good reason why we are selling so much more to France and Italy.

Finally, in the field of agriculture, the tariff for many of the major items will cease to exist in the Common Market. Other devices will be used. How we are to bargain for continued access to Europe for our farm products is a long and complex story, but it almost certainly will not depend on cutting our tariffs.

British entry into the Common Market would leave all these points intact. A good number of Britain's tariffs will come down as a result of entry, though some will go up. On some key items, Britain will push the community toward lower external tariffs.

The conclusion emerges that our export performance – and it is vital – will not after all sink or swim on our ability to bargain down the tariff around the Common Market. In the view of some of the best economists in Europe, of all the factors that will affect our total exports, this one ranks deep in the second division.

Proposition Two. There has, indeed, been something of an "invasion" of Europe by American firms in the past three years. However, while the considerations involved in each corporate decision can be infinitely complex, the need to "get inside the tariff wall" is not often the decisive one. By far the strongest motive – and the only motive that is true for every case – is to get close to a booming market. An American firm sets up a subsidiary in Europe for precisely the same reason that a Pennsylvania firm sets up a branch in California. One evidence of this essential truth is the sizable number of American firms that are setting up in *more than one* of the Common Market countries.

The process of investment following exports is as old as industrial history. British firms first sold to Australia and then set up there. My own belief is that if there were no common tariff at all around the Common Market, the flow of American direct investment to Europe would not be significantly reduced. Whether this flow is a "bad thing" and costs American jobs is admittedly another matter. The point is that the height of the tariff wall around the Common Market will not be the determining factor in whether the flow of investment continues or abates. President Kennedy is far off base on this one.

Proposition Three. This may be the saddest revelation of all. It seems increasingly clear to me as an observer of the Common Market that there will be limits to our ability to bargain down the common tariff, no matter how liberal our own tariff-cutting authority is.

In the first place, The Six, and above all France, increasingly see the existence of their common tariff as the essential "cement" that makes them an economic unit. Its disappearance would render their whole experiment, in a real sense, meaningless. That is why Britain is going to have to apply the common tariff to her imports from the Commonwealth, or she cannot get in the club. America will almost certainly never be able to bargain the Common Market tariff down to zero, even if we have "zero" authority ourselves. We might, to be sure, win some useful reductions.

Furthermore, the Common Market is not "it" but "them," six highly sovereign countries. And one negative vote is enough to veto a tariff cut on any item. As one of our negotiators in Geneva put it the other day, "Negotiating with the Common Market is like trying to nail a piece of jelly to the wall."

What this means in practice is that where the common tariff is really important as a protective device for Italian or French or German producers – and where a reduction would clearly improve the chances of our exporters – we will find the greatest difficulty in bargaining it down, regardless of the extent of our President's authority. Again, it is obvious that wider authority on our part will improve our chances, but it would be prudent not to overrate them.

What does all this add up to? Quite frankly, to the conclusion that next year's Reciprocal Trade Act battle will be important but not quite as earth-shaking as we will all be led to believe. I hope the President gets very liberal authority – for our own good as well as to improve our ability to bargain. But if he doesn't, I doubt very much that doom will be just around the corner.

EDWIN L. DALE, JR.

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"THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ARE LIKELY TO BE UGLY"

Ghana–Trial Run in Africa

Freetown, Sierre Leone

In Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah is trying to achieve a revolution in a non-revolutionary situation. He is trying to construct a strong and independent economy out of a dependent and unenterprising one. He is trying to make his country an exemplar for all Black Africa. He is trying to make himself the undisputed moral leader of his continent. He is trying to compel the world to listen to his Africa – not in the guise of an area disputed between East and West – but as the home of a great and authentic race speaking its own political language and philosophy. It is a considerable undertaking for one man and a group of followers. It is stupendous when you consider what he has, and what, a few years ago, his people were. And he has apparently decided how it can best be done.

Dr. Nkrumah has, for a long time and often, been accused of having been a member of the Communist Party and of still being a secret adherent. The evidence would not be sufficient to fasten suspicion on a child for stealing jam. He has always described his thought as Marxist – sometimes as Christian Marxist. But there are no signs that this thinking has been orthodox or prolonged. He is, however, a nationalist, and the modern nationalist will do almost anything and use almost anyone to achieve his aims.

It is evident that the method chosen by Dr. Nkrumah to achieve his aims bears a strong resemblance to that used in Eastern Europe. He has chosen this way because, like many Africans educated in the West, he found the physical achievements of Eastern Europe far greater than he had been led to expect, and he believes that their problems are akin to his. He has found them sympathetic and totally uncritical as well as being successful in the rapid creation of a viable state.

A "socialist" pattern was almost inevitable – given his ambitions. He wants to divest his country of the limitations placed upon him by the vast and still privileged British investments that survived colonialism. This sort of limitation, the inability wholly to control his own house, is described as "neo-colonialism." He and his followers believe that Europe and America still design for the sake of profit, to keep the new states mainly as primary producers. If a white expert now murmurs that Ghana is not ready and does not need a steel mill, this too is a manifestation of neo-colonialism.

He cannot in Africa find the free capital to carry out his plans. He believes that he can only do this in the end by strictly controlling imports and exports, revenue and production in Ghana. State capitalism and socialist control is his answer.

Opposition cannot really be tolerated. Only a united and disciplined national effort will work the miracle. Debate may, in a limited form, exist within the party (The Convention Peoples Party). But the party is not, as in Communism, an elite; it is the whole loyal majority of the nation in political action.

To assist this policy of centralization, Dr. Nkrumah has encouraged or countenanced the cult of personality, with himself hailed by a series of eccentric, occasionally blasphemous titles. George Washington – even safely dead – was never so praised. It is a serious crime now to denigrate the President of Ghana. The cult may be distasteful to strangers; still it is not unusual in Africa. Liberia, Guinea, East Africa and most of the ex-French republics are doing the same. A really uneducated and unsophisticated ex-colonial country that has lost its traditions or which never had any needs a hero figure with which to identify. It is the only known way of covering up the appalling scar left by colonialism, the abiding sense of inadequacy and humiliation. By almost any realistic standard the British achievement in Ghana was both honorable and admirable; but nevertheless the scar in Ghana is as wide and as long as any in the world.

The parliamentary system, though not rejected outright, is suspect as a foreign imposition and not thought to suit the "African personality." Opposition is a form of disloyalty and so the effective leaders of the opposition are in jail and something like a Peoples' Court has been set up to try them. Ministers out of sympathy with the trend are dismissed. (There is good evidence that the Ghanaian opposition similarly rejects the concept and niceties of elected government and loyal opposition. Their ideas however no longer bear on the situation.)

In foreign policy everything is seen through aggrieved African eyes. In the Ghanaian Government only those problems that directly impinge on Africa or colonialism really concern them. This of course is the basis for the neutrals' double standard about which so much was written at the time of the Belgrade conference. To a Westerner who believes that colonialism in Africa is gasping its last and who believes that even more urgent problems exist, it may not seem a wise or

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mature or even very moral way of looking at the world. To an African nationalist it is inevitable.

And such preoccupations imply at least a temporary sympathy with the Eastern Powers. Not only is there no conflict of interests here, there is a coincidence of views in almost all that concerns Ghana. Russia supports Ghana in the Congo; Welensky, Verwoerd, Colonial Portugal, France, Britain and Spain do not – and they are Russia's enemies too. There is no need for the Russians to push Ghana; they have merely to give her her head.

So far as infiltration goes, there has been little direct Russian action in Ghana, no massive projects. There have been some large and ill considered purchases; there are going to be more Communist technicians and more underdeveloped industries left in their care. Cadets, mostly from Ghana's Eastern-modelled Workers Brigade, have gone to Russia; so have a number of students. But there is as yet no sign that any of this has had any effect.

It is all somewhat alarming, but there remain alleviating factors. Dr. Nkrumah has as yet burned no boats. He does not want to join the Russian or Chinese bloc. He wants to head his own.

Dr. Nkrumah still urgently requires economic help for his policy of political and economic aggrandisement. He needs US help for his Volta River project and he counts President Kennedy as a trustworthy friend. The British connection is still not only a useful one; it is regarded – in the intervals of perfervid abuse – with some affection and pride. During the recent Royal visit to Ghana, the Government newspaper described the Queen as "the greatest socialist monarch in the world" and praise can reach no higher.

The Royal Tour

In considering the future of Ghana this visit cannot be ignored. Royal tours tend to be of limited and temporary interest. They are usually celebrations of existing connections. For local monarchists, of course, they have a mystical import. But they do not affect the local political situation. If this tour – as many British MPs and newspapers wanted – had been cancelled, that would have changed the situation almost as radically as the cancellation of the Aswan dam loan changed Egypt. But now that the tour has happened, it can be seen that several things emerged.

Dr. Nkrumah, because of his Draconian budget and because of the suppression of several popular figures, has lost his old charismatic popularity. There were no hostile demonstrations against him, only the sort of polite near-indifference that usually greets a British prime minister. His reception was in marked contrast to that of the Queen. This of course was partly, though not wholly, explained by the curiosity she arouses, by the fact that most crowds prefer a crowned head to one under a top hat and by the African natural taste for mystery and monarchy. Yet any detached observer would report that whole towns turned out and mobs went wild to greet an emissary from the past. Admittedly, the crowds are not counted for much; as one of the Ministers said, "Anyway they can always be led, if you see what I mean."

The tour also served to show how deep the division in mind between the rulers of Ghana and the West has gone. The press who attended the tour dealt most with two men, both young and both British educated. There was the Minister of Information, Mr. Adamafio, plump, extrovert, rude, quick witted and ruthless. There was the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Boateng, thin, sickly, quiet and a master of dialectic. They are financially incorruptible. They are No. 2 and No. 3 in the set up – though a long way behind No. 1. In a series of ugly and discourteous contacts with the press, they showed how little they cared for Western opinion. They bitterly resented criticism in the British and American papers. They threatened to arrest two journalists and expelled two more when the Queen had gone. They resented the inaccuracies that were inevitable in that famine of information. They made no bones about their impatience with this formal contact with the West and their eagerness to get their version of the future going. The tour served to illuminate the differences between Ghana and the West.

Ghana, despite its charm and its comparative wealth, is only a small quadrilateral under the lefthand shoulder of Africa. It has no strategic significance. Its foreign policy, particularly over the unification of Africa, has hardly left the ground. The Western world could survive without discomfort the loss of its cocoa and ores. But the days when countries could be dismissed like that are gone as surely as the befeathered governors from Government House in Accra.

The analogy with Cuba is a real one. All the young Turks in Africa are watching Ghana and most of them are admiring what they see. The West could by overreacting repeat the errors made in Cuba. This too, as a revolution, is angry, *ad hoc*, highly personal, headlong, virtually unplanned, essentially undemocratic, sentimentally Marxist. There is nothing we can do to stop it and this is Africa's trial run.

The next few months are likely to be ugly in Ghana. The ugliness will be the work of a government in a hurry and of a government that has no valid precedents to work on. The situation is not a hopeless one, but to prevent it becoming so will require subtle patience and toleration – until such time as other sovereign states can shout back and act back as to an equal.

PATRICK O'DONOVAN

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What's in a Name? Plenty!

With a Kennedy, son of a former ambassador, in the White House, another in the Department of Justice, and assorted others mentioned as candidates for this and that; with a Harrison in the Senate, a Roosevelt in the House, a Lodge in Massachusetts and a Taft in Ohio campaigning; with a Stevenson, son of a former Vice President, holding an ambassadorship and offered a Senatorial nomination on a silver platter, so to speak; with a second-generation Long and a second-generation Talmadge holding Louisiana and Georgia in fee; and with a second-generation Wagner coming up fast in New York, it would seem that certain comments made recently in this place touching the development of an American Ruling Class were a feeble understatement. Family is not coming to be, it already is the springiest of political springboards.

Adams, to be sure, is momentarily in eclipse, and Hoover, owing to a party catastrophe, is not represented even by an ambassador to Ireland; but who doubts that these shadows will pass? Party managers know that there is magic in a name, provided it isn't Johnson or Smith, clans too prolific to bear titular distinction. The Vice President shines with no glory reflected from Hiram, nor Margaret Chase from Al.

So what does it signify? Probably no more than that this republic is nearing the end of its second century as a solidly-established government. When institutions endure for six or seven generations there always arise specialists in the management of the institutions and the art and mystery tends to be transmitted, not by the genes, but by brilliant instruction in certain families, much as violin-making was transmitted in Cremona.

It is possible, no doubt, that this prefigures the decline and fall of American democracy, but it is hard to see why it should be regarded as probable. A true oligarchy is a one-party system, and our nascent Ruling Class has shown no tendency, thus far, to concentrate. Of the three families that have furnished two Presidents each, only Harrison has been consistently conservative. Roosevelt even now plays both sides of the street, and John Quincy Adams was elected as a Jeffersonian, after serving as Monroe's Secretary of State. The development here has been rather like that in 18th Century England, where Whigs were quite as aristocratic as Tories.

But that it does mean the appearance of a political aristocracy is hardly to be denied. Right now a politically ambitious young American has a long start if he bears the name of Roosevelt or Taft. If our institutions remain stable for another century he will presumably have a longer start; which may be unjust, but is not irrational. If the young Squire of Hyde Park had a kinsman who was a terrific politician, it was a reasonable assumption that the young Squire himself must have given some attention to the means whereby the cousin had brought such fame to the family. This assumption by the party bosses of Dutchess County was, as the event proved, not unjustified. The craftsman's skill is not an inherited characteristic. But it is transmitted by instruction; and instruction by example is usually considered superior to that by precept.

Acquisition of any skill presupposes leisure enough to master its basic principles, and leisure to study means – or he has meant until very recently – an advantageous financial position. Political skill thus tends to flow toward families that are what Boston calls "comfortably off," if not quite rich. But is there any kind of advantage that doesn't tend to flow in the same direction? The republic has always stood in danger of degenerating into a plutocracy. That danger will not be eliminated by discouraging the acquisition of political skill by young men who have money enough to devote their time to studying the art of managing public affairs. If the scions of the well-heeled are really learning how to run the country, the country stands to profit, for *somebody* ought to know. It isn't democracy, it is pseudo-democracy, egalitarianism, that cherishes the delusion of what Lippmann long ago derided as "the omnicompetent citizen." A Ruling Class is not undemocratic; all depends upon whether it holds authority by delegation or by usurpation – purchase, of course, being a peculiarly vicious usurpation.

So the rising tide of young Kennedys, Tafts, Roosevelts, Harrisons, Hoovers and others who are half-elected merely by the names they bear does not strike this superficial observer as necessarily a cause for public lamentation. All of them will be well taught and some of them will be intelligent. Possibly one, here or there, may, like J. Q. Adams, actually refurbish the escutcheon. If they all aspire to serve as nothing less than Cabinet officers, what of it? They will give us a lot of good bureau chiefs.

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Communist Disunity and the West

by Zbigniew Brzezinski

Togliatti, the head of the Italian Communist Party, was asked by his comrades on his return to Rome from the recent Moscow Congress, "What is unity in the Communist world?" In Stalin's lifetime a Communist did not need to ponder this question. Today, it is the key problem facing Communism.

In openly breaking with Stalinism, Mr. Khrushchev has pulled out all stops: Never before have the Soviet people been told so much about the crimes of their Soviet regime or about the inner workings of its politics. The account of Stalin's criminality, and that of his associates, was graphic and even macabre. The execution by Stalin of his own brother-in-law, who refused to plead for mercy; the last message from a condemned Civil War hero, and the cynical and brutal comments penciled on it by Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov and Kaganovich; the killing by Beria and Malenkov of high Party officials in Beria's study; etc., all have now been described in detail. And on the political side, the Soviet people were told that in all likelihood it was Stalin who engineered the assassination in 1934 of Kirov, a potential rival, and the Soviet people, furthermore, were treated to a detailed account of the 1957 attempted *coup* against Khrushchev by the anti-Party group, including the use by Bulganin of his own bodyguards, the dramatic scenes in the Party Presidium, and so forth. The impact of all of this will be felt for many years and could even generate a strong popular reaction against the Party's dictatorship.

Khrushchev first condemned Stalin secretly in 1956 for domestic reasons. Since then, the issue of Stalinism has come to mean the entire Khrushchev line, especially foreign policy, including the Chinese criticism of his fear of war. Hence at the 22nd Party Congress the attack on Stalinism was in effect a defense of Khrushchev's primacy, of the Soviet leadership in the bloc, and of the right of the Soviet Union to shape its foreign policy according to its own estimates. Domestically, Khrushchev knows that the anti-Party group is no danger to him; he may even calculate that the anti-Stalin campaign would strengthen his appeal within the junior ranks of the Party. He knows that these younger elements would welcome the opportunities for advancement which anti-Stalinism and the crusade for legality offer them. This was evident in Shelepin's and Polyansky's speeches. But also, he probably fears that pressures of this sort could easily get out of hand and threaten those remaining Soviet leaders who shared in Stalin's crimes: Kuusinen, Mikoyan, and last but not least Khrushchev himself. For this reason, the next months will presumably see efforts to strike some kind of balance between these conflicting aspirations. In the meantime, elsewhere in the bloc, he is forcing even his silent opponents to choose between Stalinism and Communist unity, in the expectation that most will choose unity.

At the same time, Mr. Khrushchev's decision has profoundly altered his relationship with the Chinese. Abandoning the position of trying to defend Communist unity in the face of Chinese attacks – a position which he held during a large part of the Sino-Soviet dispute – he dramatically gave the Chinese the option of deciding whether to protect Communist unity or not. This he did by openly – and therefore irrevocably – breaking with Albania which since the summer of 1960 has been siding with the Chinese. Presumably in an effort to underscore his seriousness, he instructed his Ambassador in Peking to repeat publicly the Soviet charges. Khrushchev could not afford to allow Tirana to get away with its defiance; failure to crack down on Hoxha invited imitation of the Albanians by such Stalinists as Ulbricht in East Germany, Novotny in Czechoslovakia, Gheorghiu-Dej in Rumania. To protect Soviet leadership in the camp he had to condemn the Albanians, and doing it openly meant that there was no further room for subtle pressure on Moscow: the move was irrevocable and the option whether or not to protect Communist unity was put to Peking.

In doing this Khrushchev may very well have underestimated the Chinese stake in Albania. Failure to support Albania would have meant a colossal loss of prestige; it would have meant in effect the full subordination of Peking to Moscow. Khrushchev perhaps forgot that the Chinese Communists are not only Communist but Chinese; lacking Stalin's prestige he cannot simply ignore national pride among his supporters. After all, the Communist leaders who listened to the Chinese and Albanian attacks on Khrushchev in 1960, and often defended him (knowing he needed the defense), could not have the same personal sense of deference

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toward the Kremlin that they had in the past. Furthermore, some of them – especially those who in the past were most obeisant to the Soviets – have already shown signs of an "ecstatic emancipation" from their former mentors that often turns to violent hostility. This was very much the case with the Yugoslavs after 1948; today the Albanians are doing the same thing; tomorrow it could be the Bulgarians or the Czechs.

A crisis over the succession in either Moscow or Peking, matched by heightened insecurity in the Soviet or Chinese ruling elites, could spark these latent feelings into even more direct clashes. For instance, an anti-Soviet faction in Peking engaged in a struggle for succession could even deliberately attempt to worsen Sino-Soviet relations in order to strengthen its domestic position. Needless to add, a simultaneous succession crisis in both Moscow and Peking could lead to even greater dangers and trigger similar reactions in the other Communist capitals. Khrushchev's hints at the Congress that Molotov enjoys more foreign than domestic support suggest how bloc tensions might intensify domestic struggles.

Persistent Sino-Soviet disagreement since 1956 has changed the nature of Soviet power in the bloc. In most cases, that power could today be defined as "last-resort power" – *i.e.*, the Soviets would be almost certain to intervene by force to keep a Communist state from defecting to the "imperialistic" side. But they no longer have at their disposal the more intricate combinations of authority and consent which Stalin used to prevent other national elites from taking even a limited step that displeased him. Economic levers, political displeasure and ideological isolation are all pressures Moscow can still apply, but in each case it must now weigh the possibility that pressure can be counterproductive and that a party can turn to the Chinese, or even to the West, for help (particularly if economic levers are used). The Soviets can still intrigue within a ruling elite, taking advantage of factions, but Gomulka's and, more recently Hoxha's, experiences suggest that this is not always effective.

Comrades

In politics one change has a way of leading to another. At the November, 1960, conference the Soviet Union commanded the loyalty of the vast majority of the parties, and even those favoring the Chinese probably would have sided with the CPSU had the chips been down. The same was true in November, 1961, although about 30 parties preferred to be silent on the Albanian question rather than side with either the Soviets or the Chinese. But at some future conference the CPSU may be faced with more opposition. And what will happen if someday a majority of the Communist parties rejects a Soviet draft defining the policy of international Communism? The 1960 Moscow conference indicated that the Soviet conception of the Soviet interest is no longer an automatic guideline for the other Communist parties. What is good for the Soviet Union is no longer automatically accepted as good for international Communism or the bloc. Furthermore, the attitudes adopted by the various parties on issues like the inevitability of war, the nature of imperialism, and the anti-Stalin campaign suggest a trend toward polarization between the more developed and the less developed countries. Eventually each side may find itself charging the other with subordinating "proletarian internationalism" to its own interests. Uneven development linked to an uneven intensity of revolutionary expectation will subject any monolithic ideology – Communist or not – to a great strain.

The Soviet bloc has thus changed into a far more complicated Communist universe which already includes several constellations: the solid Soviet bloc, composed primarily of the East European elites; the Chinese-Albanian alignment, which enjoys some popularity within the Bulgarian, Czech, East German and perhaps other East European ruling circles; the Vietnamese and the North Koreans, who are the "Communist neutralists," carefully steering middle course between Moscow and Peking (although the Vietnamese have moved closer to the Chinese on the Albanian issue); the "fellow-traveler" states like Cuba and

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Guinea; and finally, the nonruling parties. These nonruling parties also differ from one another: some, like the Italian, go along with Khrushchev but feel he has not gone far enough; others, like the French, endorse him grudgingly; still others, like the Indonesian, support the Chinese; lastly, some are splitting internally.

Hardening the Schisms

The very existence of alternative Soviet and Chinese models not only stimulates factional struggles, but immediately gives a focus and a rationale to such struggles, even when they arise from purely personal or administrative conflicts. A faction challenging the prevailing leadership will use Soviet or Chinese arguments on its own behalf whenever it can, to avoid the appearance of deviationism. Such factional conflicts in turn feed back into the Sino-Soviet relationship, providing new bones of contention and sources of ill-feeling. The defeat of the moderate "Khrushchev" faction in Albania, for example, seems to have embittered Russia's relations with China even though neither country had any vital interest in the local conflict.

The interests of the ruling Chinese and Soviet elites cannot always be identical, even if the elites consciously strive to agree. Neither nation will allow its future to be guided in an unacceptable direction by the other, or even by an international Party Congress. Rather, each will try to persuade its potential supporters in the other country, and in the Party Congress, that its views are correct. Persuasion requires precise definition of a country's position, and further emphasizes and rigidifies points of divergence. Persuasion also requires open debate, such as occurred last month. This creates pressures for a split, as the Soviet-Chinese-Albanian triangle shows. Mutual *open* criticism is almost impossible to contain: there is an inescapable factor of escalation in doctrinal conflict, as the Soviet-Albanian exchanges illustrate.

Yet the very divergence of Chinese and Soviet policies may make them voice their ideological unity more loudly. Insistent emphasis on the common Marxist-Leninist doctrine, even when reduced to loud incantations, is not only a way of camouflaging differences but also of trying to achieve united action. Nevertheless, different stages of socio-economic development, varying emphases on the urgency of modernization, and differing relationships of Communism to nationalism (ranging from a linkage of the industrial, national and Communist revolution in China to a sharp conflict of the last two in Eastern Europe) are bound to produce a variety of Marxist-Leninist brews. This is already evident in the different Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the same phenomena (*e.g.*, imperialism) given by Khrushchev and Mao. Reliance on Marxism-Leninism as an antidote to the pervasive Sino-Soviet divergence and to other emerging bloc polarities might produce a purely symbolic consensus around a doctrine which is consciously intended to be all things to all people. Changes in doctrine would no longer be a matter of a dictator or an elite's making adjustments with reality while still believing that the universal doctrine remains absolutely right. Instead, a dictator or an elite would consciously fuzz ideological formulations – while firmly believing that some private interpretation is more correct but cannot be expressed because of the higher imperative of unity. These compromises, with their cynicism and manipulation, cannot but threaten the domestic elite's faith in their ideology, especially when the ideology has a different prophet in one country than in another (*i.e.*, Stalin in China, Lenin in Russia). Some Communist parties, notably the Italian, have already decided to guide themselves in the future by their own assessments of the domestic situation and not by Moscow directives.

What will the word "Communism" then signify? In the history of ideas, the "relativization" of a hitherto absolute doctrine is the first stage in the erosion of the doctrine's vitality. That is why prolonged Sino-Soviet tension is so ominous for the Communist world.

In some respects, the Communist camp may be able to capitalize on its greater internal diversity. By appearing flexible, the camp may attract quasi-Marxist regimes like Cuba or Guinea. The Communists can point to their internal diversity as proof that those states need not fear Soviet domination. The Soviet Union has already made some gains from appearing to be more flexible than the Chinese. It is striking to note, for instance, that the ruling parties of four non-Communist states (Ghana, Mali, Guinea and Cuba) saw fit to send official delegates to the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Even so, the new external strategy is likely to encourage further change within the camp. Nations like Poland and Czechoslovakia will fear being taken for granted by the USSR if Soviet attention continues to focus on wooing nations like Cuba or Guinea. We may expect established members of the bloc to seek a "most-favored-nation" clause from the Soviet Union, much the way the East Germans did when the USSR was courting Gomulka's Poland in 1956, or the way Latin American states have recently done with the United States, after watching Marshall Plan aid go to Europe. These opportunities will increase when China acquires a nuclear capability.

The transformation of the Soviet bloc, and particularly the impact on it of the increasingly complex Sino-Soviet relationship, can be viewed as part of the fracturing of the post-World War II globe. The Western world was the first to experience this break-up, especially with the emergence of the post-colonial neutral

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Who's Rocking the Boat?

"To lay bare a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries openly in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude." – CHOU EN-LAI, *October 19*

"The anti-Marxist lies and attacks of Nikita Khrushchev serve only the enemies of Communism and of the Albanian People's Republic – the various imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists."
– *Central Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party, October 20*

"Molotov is trying to cook up a certain sectarian platform for his further antiparty speculations. It appears that he decided to muddy the water so that later on he could try to catch fish in there. Who knows, perhaps some bony ruff might take a bite. [Laughter.] If it is not in the domestic reservoirs, then perhaps in some foreign waters. [Animation in the hall, laughter.]"
– O. KUUSINEN, *member of the CPSU Presidium, October 26*

". . . The true unity of fraternal Communist and workers parties is possible only on a principled Marxist-Leninist foundation and not on hushing up the vicious course of the Albanian leadership."
– FROL KOZLOV, *member of the CPSU Presidium, October 28*

states. Yugoslavia signaled the Soviet bloc's susceptibility to this phenomenon, and more recent events suggest that the process is continuing.

The Communist leaders, many of whom are doubtless aware of this process, may calculate that the present diversity in the bloc is an inevitable price of their success. They may feel that in the foreseeable future the increasing pace of economic and institutional integration of the bloc, and the still overwhelming ideological commitment to international solidarity, will suffice to contain the process of differentiation that all large-scale social organizations inevitably experience. At the same time, they may calculate that the pace of external socio-economic revolutions will bring closer the "inevitable" Communist victory and that continued external successes may rekindle internal ideological enthusiasm, subsuming their various divergencies. A leading Soviet ideologue has, for instance, made some very interesting projections in *Kommunist*, the organ of the CPSU, of the existing economic and demographic trends in order to show that by 1980 the Communist camp will include significantly larger portions of mankind. In effect, the processes of internal political differentiation and ideological relativization, pointing toward bloc polycentrism, are engaged in a race with the bloc's expectations of world hegemony and hence unity. For this reason, the future of the bloc depends increasingly on the attitudes and actions of the West.

At the Party Congress last month, Mr. Khrushchev postponed his Berlin deadline while setting off the 50 megaton bomb explosion. The test was clearly designed to demonstrate Soviet might to Communist critics of the Khrushchev line and to persuade Western public opinion to abandon its nuclear deterrent, while perhaps developing the means for insuring at least relative invulnerability from a Western nuclear strike. Khrushchev's renewed emphasis on contradictions in the Western camp thus reflects his expectation that the West will not unite over the Berlin issue, especially if existing pressure is applied subtly. Terror plus patience equals peace with victories: that is Khrushchev's formula until Soviet invulnerability is achieved. However, an open split with the Chinese could possibly force Khrushchev into a more aggressive policy in order to intensify the pressure for Communist unity. Only the West's willingness to fight gives Khrushchev the impetus to risk disunity with China. In effect, to help him with the Chinese, one must be firm with him. Thus the paradox of the present situation is that we must act the way the Chinese portray us and not the way Khrushchev paints us, so that Khrushchev is strengthened in his argument with the Chinese that there is a real danger of war.

Precisely for this reason it is dangerous to assume that Khrushchev needs concessions in Berlin to strengthen his hand against Stalinists and the Chinese. Our weakness is in effect his weakness. Furthermore, even assuming that he is in danger (which does not seem to be the case), it does not follow that some "dangerous" Stalinist would be his successor if Khrushchev were actually removed. It is far more likely that his fall would result in bitter and prolonged power struggles, with bloc members participating in them. Given the existing confusion in the Soviet Union prompted by the anti-Stalin campaign, Khrushchev's fall could give the West a badly needed breathing spell.

But the West should not wait for the unlikely to happen. We failed to come out with timely initiatives in the immediate aftermath of Stalin's death, when the Soviet leadership was disunited, and we never tried to take the political offensive after the 1956 crisis in Communist ranks. We should not miss the present opportunity. Accordingly, firmness, for instance in Berlin should not preclude moves designed to further promote diversity in the Communist complex. A reassurance to the Poles on the Oder-Neisse line, a commitment not to give nuclear weapons to the West Germans, even a proposal to the Soviet Union that Eastern Europe join

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certain socio-economic Western European undertakings might – even if the formal Communist reaction is negative – generate further fissures by reducing East European fears. At some point, the US could dramatically offer to sponsor East European development which under Communism has not been very effective. Its acceptance would outrage the Chinese. Its refusal, presumably under Soviet pressure, would further strain Soviet-East European ties.

At the same time, it might make very good sense to maintain our present attitude toward China, since Sino-American conflict generates Chinese bitterness toward Khrushchev for getting along with us at all. Yet such an American policy presupposes continued Soviet vulnerability. Moscow would inevitably be more interested in placating Peking than Washington if Soviet survival were not at stake. A US policy based on a credible willingness and a capacity to fight is thus a major factor in Communist disunity.

The historical paradox of Communism is that it came both too soon and too late. It failed in the developed West because it is an ideology of social revolution formulated after the major revolutions were over. It may fail in the East because its success requires true internationalism, which comes only after a revolution has brought national development and maturity. Yet even in terms of the Party's own ideology, development and maturity render dictatorship of any sort, even by the Communist Party, historically obsolescent. Thus in a developed nation like the USSR, the Party has to fall back on continued external expansion and domestic nationalism as sources of social support. But expansion and nationalism in turn create the dangers of war, which Khrushchev wishes to avoid, and generate pressures for Russian self-assertion, which prevent his giving adequate consideration to the interests of "fraternal parties," especially the Chinese.

Today, the East is riding the crest of nationalism, while the West is becoming international. Khrushchev's brand of Communism is caught in between.

Nuclear Arms for NATO?

by Robert Osgood

While Britain's overtures to the Common Market raise hopes that the time-worn aspiration of a "united Europe" may be gaining new substance, NATO – the center of military power in Europe, upon which the very survival of any free economic community depends – continues to flounder. Its military strategy and capability, still so largely dependent upon the threat of American nuclear retaliation, has long since been outmoded by the rise of Soviet nuclear power, by the economic and political resurgence of the Continental members, and by the prospect of several allies building their own nuclear weapons. The resulting lag between generally acknowledged requirements and existing strategy and capabilities jeopardizes the political cohesion as well as the military security of the alliance. What can be done to overcome the lag?

Since 1957 there has been sporadic support in NATO – promoted most energetically by General Norstad and the Bonn Government – for making NATO itself a nuclear power, as an alternative to the United States trying to preserve its virtual nuclear monopoly in the alliance and to other allies trying to acquire "the bomb" on their own. By 1960, this multinational proposal had picked up enough momentum so that the outgoing Eisenhower Administration endorsed the "concept" last December before the NATO foreign ministers of a NATO-controlled seaborne medium-range ballistic missile force. The Kennedy Administration, after first backing away from this tentative initiative, expressed interest but made further support subject to some measure of agreement among the allies on how this NATO force would be controlled. At Ottawa, on May 17, President Kennedy told the Canadian parliament that the US looked forward to "the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved." And on November 17, following Chancellor Adenauer's statement that NATO should be able to order the use of atomic weapons without prior authorization of the President of the United

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States, Secretary Rusk told a press conference that the Ottawa offer still stood, provided the allies would agree upon the organization and guidelines for the control and use of a NATO nuclear force. Thus, the door to a NATO nuclear force has been opened wider, but the US cautiously declines to move through it, preferring her allies to take the initiative.

Who Pulls the Trigger?

Rusk was not exaggerating when he warned that the problem of nuclear control was "of quite literally the utmost complexity." The political and military management of a nuclear force by 15 NATO powers goes to the "very life and death of nations . . . to the very heart of the responsibilities of governments for the fate of their own peoples." This problem is, moreover, inextricably entangled with the broader and no less tractable problem of 15 nations supporting a collective military strategy and force adequate to protect themselves in radically changing conditions of security. As the President knows, none of these related political and military problems could be solved by a multilateral nuclear force without the approval of Congress and, in particular, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. And that Committee has jealously guarded its legal prerogatives, established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its various amendments, to approve or disapprove agreements for nuclear cooperation and to make sure that the US preserves effective custody of nuclear warheads.

Basically, the issue of nuclear control in NATO arises because the circumstances that originally made the allies content to entrust their security almost entirely to America's nuclear forces – that is, America's clear nuclear preponderance over Russia and the allies' economic dependence and military helplessness – no longer exist. The impressive demonstrations of Russia's nuclear capacity to strike back at the US have undermined allied confidence in a strategy that, despite all the promises to throw back the aggressor at the threshold or at least force him to pause and reconsider, has really depended overwhelmingly upon America's threat to meet conventional aggression with nuclear retaliation. Today, America's allies fear on the one hand that the US will *not* resort (or that the Soviet Union will not believe that it will resort) to nuclear retaliation and will thus leave them defenseless; on the other hand, they fear that the US *will* resort to nuclear retaliation and thus carry them over the abyss into a suicidal war. Whether or not their dependence on nuclear weapons encourages overt non-nuclear aggression, it surely renders the collective will of the alliance vulnerable to the Soviet game of building up tensions and confronting the allies with the choice between thermonuclear catastrophe or peaceful accommodation on Soviet terms. Meanwhile, the Russians exploit the resulting splits among the allies.

The spectacular economic recovery of Western Europe and the concomitant resurgence of their independent political dispositions increases their dissatisfaction with US control over a decision so fateful as that of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. The technical possibility that France and West Germany can build rudimentary nuclear capabilities in the not too distant future adds to this dissatisfaction the contagious prospect of other allies doing likewise – following Britain's example in exploiting what the 1956 Atomic Energy Act called "substantial progress" toward a nuclear capability in order to extract greater nuclear assistance from the US and a greater voice in allied councils.

To be sure, an ally's technical ability to build "the bomb" and deliver it, does not necessarily mean that it will consider the effort worthwhile militarily, economically and politically; but the very possibility raises a disquieting prospect: Several key allies might devote their major defense efforts to the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities rather than to the integrated conventional forces which everyone agrees, in the abstract, NATO badly needs. Such proliferation would not only divert allied contributions from collective needs it would foster distrust and intensify political differences among them during a period in which the alliance must have all the cohesion it can muster. It would also increase the chance of an accidental or rash use of nuclear weapons and virtually preclude NATO's coordinating and limiting a nuclear response.

The plan for a NATO nuclear force is, therefore, a natural reaction to a felt need for consolidation rather than disintegration. It provides the Western allies with an equitable share of nuclear control *inside* rather than outside NATO's auspices while, hopefully, employing some of the resources that would otherwise be sunk into independent nuclear capabilities of dubious military value toward meeting NATO's urgent non-nuclear needs. Yet the creation of a nuclear force under genuine multilateral control raises the most delicate political and intricate technical and administrative problems, which have heretofore carried great weight in determining the Kennedy Administration's reluctance to resume its predecessor's initiative, beyond offering to "assign" a few Polaris submarines, under American operational control, to NATO. Meanwhile, there has been no effort to implement the scheme, to which the Allies agreed "in principle" in 1957, for placing missiles on allied soil under allied control while keeping control of the warheads under the American Supreme Allied Commander, acting as the commander in charge of American forces in Europe.

To devise an acceptable yet militarily effective and

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politically responsive organization and directives by which three, four or possibly fifteen members can decide whether and how to use nuclear weapons presents political difficulties that may be insurmountable, since they impinge so directly upon basic notions of national autonomy. (In any case, the Berlin crisis is not the time to try to surmount them.) But even if these difficulties could be surmounted, there remain three major arguments against a NATO nuclear force on grounds of military security: (a) US nuclear power is sufficient as a second-strike force for the entire alliance, but assigning part of it to NATO's control would jeopardize the deterrent to direct attacks upon this country; (b) America's nuclear force is a more credible deterrent to an attack on the European allies than a multilateral force would be, since it is not hampered by allied vetoes on its use, and since sharing her nuclear responsibility might be interpreted as a sign that the US was disengaging her own nuclear force from the protection of Europe; (c) America's nuclear force is more responsive to central political control and military command, which are essential to prevent the accidental or rash use of nuclear weapons and to keep any war, including a nuclear one, subject to some kind of physical limitation and political bargaining.

These are persuasive arguments. The trouble with them is that the choice may not be between a multilateral force and American control, but between a multilateral force and several unilaterally-controlled forces; few who oppose a joint NATO deterrent would prefer four or five separate, national deterrents.

It is probably true that no ally can acquire a more effective deterrent against any likely military threat, or any better bargaining position inside or outside the alliance, by wielding its own inferior nuclear capability than by relying upon America's relatively vast and invulnerable force – at least, not as long as American troops remain on the Continent and we continue to regard the defense of Western Europe as an interest comparable to the defense of the US itself. At the same time, any ally's attempt to use its nuclear capability to trigger America's force or as a means of implicating that force in the support of special allied political positions would run the risk of producing just the opposite effect – compelling the US to qualify or repudiate her obligations to defend that ally.

These points ought to be conveyed to our allies. Yet one cannot assume that the military logic of the situation will discourage France, West Germany and others from following the American and British example: in the long run, no major nation will be willing to leave such fateful decisions as whether or how to use nuclear weapons entirely in American hands if it can avoid it. Quite apart from the symbolic significance of nuclear weapons for national prestige, vital considerations of national equity and sovereignty are at stake. After all, no nation can be sure about what will succeed or fail in deterring the Soviet Union or in resisting nuclear blackmail under various circumstances. Deterrence is not a science; it must be gauged by systematic intuition. Since the US has become vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack and her allies no longer regard themselves as abject American dependents in other respects, it would be remarkable if they did not prefer to exercise something of their own intuitions with respect to the military and political uses of nuclear weapons, rather than putting their trust (and security) entirely in the wisdom of the American Government.

One can expect allies to be particularly anxious to control or share control of the decision to use nuclear weapons that are based on their own territory. Seaborne missiles would not circumvent this problem in the case of allies upon whose territory so-called tactical nuclear weapons were based. Yet it is probably unrealistic to share control of tactical nuclear weapons and not of strategic nuclear weapons, since there is no clear, reliable distinction between the two (some of the "tactical" missiles on German soil now have a range of 600 miles), and there is little confidence that the use of small nuclear warheads against battlefield military targets would be anything more than a short prelude to general nuclear warfare.

Allied Fears of Germany

Among those presently non-nuclear allies who may, therefore, be anxious as well as able to build their own nuclear capabilities, one will surely be the German Federal Republic. West Germany has the necessary scientific and productive capacity and, as the most powerful land force in NATO and the nation most directly affected by Soviet pressure, is in a position to insist upon equality with her nuclear allies, despite the present treaty restrictions upon her military program. Yet German nuclear armament would stir up an ominous political storm in NATO. Even her access to tactical nuclear weapons, the warheads of which remain under American control, has aroused the British. Partly for this reason, as well as for reasons of domestic opinion, the Bonn Government has been the most outspoken advocate of a NATO nuclear force. It is not unlikely that other allies might also prefer nuclear sharing in NATO to the dispersion of nuclear control to Germany and to others; for even those who have the material opportunity to join the nuclear club must see that the advantages diminish as the membership increases.

But would allies who might want to build their own nuclear weapons believe that a NATO nuclear force would give them their proper share of nuclear control? They know that, in that event, they would not have

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as much power to determine when and how to use nuclear weapons; but they *would* have a voice in the use of a much more effective nuclear force than they could acquire independently, and they would have it at less expense. They would also have more power to prevent and confine the use of nuclear weapons in the European area, even though the US would undoubtedly reserve her own strategic force outside multilateral control. It is possible, therefore, that with American inducements and pressures, the Germans, the British and other allies would regard a genuinely multilateral system of nuclear control as, on balance, the best alternative to either America's exclusive control or to independent nuclear efforts. In that case, even de Gaulle's France would find it difficult to remain aloof, since it would be obvious that by remaining outside the club it would deprive itself of that military and political voice in NATO councils which is one of the primary objectives of her effort to develop an independent nuclear force.

Yet, even if a system of genuine multilateral control were acceptable to all the allies, the condition of its acceptability might, under the stress of an extreme crisis, prove so ponderous as to diminish its deterrent value and destroy its ability to control the use of nuclear weapons if the deterrent failed. To meet this difficulty a number of systems of centralized political and military control, short of putting "15 fingers on the trigger and the safety catch," have been unofficially proposed; but the whole matter has never reached the stage of concerted official study, active exploration and negotiation, which would provide the test of its feasibility. Before the matter reaches that stage of organization, however, there has to be a clearer consensus in NATO on the *strategy* for using nuclear weapons, which, in turn, is connected with NATO's strategy and capability for employing non-nuclear weapons. Any effective multilateral control of nuclear weapons presupposes an agreement among the allies on the kinds of circumstances and the ways in which nuclear weapons presupposes an agreement among the allies on the kinds of circumstances and the ways in which nuclear weapons would be employed.

A New Conventional Strategy

With some difficulty, the Kennedy Administration is trying to move the alliance toward a military strategy and capability which will raise the threshold of effective conventional resistance to a level that will enable it to fight a local conventional war, not just "force a pause" upon the aggressor. This is essential for the sake of the cohesion of the alliance and its resolution in the face of Soviet pressure, as well as for the deterrence of overt armed incursions. It is likewise indispensable for the effective operation of a joint nuclear capability; for the problem of a number of governments deciding with suitable dispatch on where, when and how nuclear weapons are to be used, under joint political and military direction, against a local non-nuclear aggression would be virtually insurmountable in the absence of a political federation. On the other hand, to the extent the allies can reserve nuclear weapons as a retaliatory force to deter the *adversary* from using them, they will vastly ease the task of agreeing upon advance directives and guidelines and upon control procedures for the employment of nuclear weapons. With an adequate conventional-resistance capability, a joint nuclear force would be no less effective as a deterrent and as an instrument of policy than is America's nuclear force. The very existence of a NATO nuclear force would be concrete evidence of a strategic consensus and a common will among the allies, which would reinforce deterrence.

The creation of such a multinational force is thus not just an intricate, delicate task of organization; it entails a revision of NATO's whole military strategy and capabilities. If the dispersion of nuclear responsibility were conceived as a substitute for this revision, it would undermine the security and cohesion of the alliance; but if this revision is conceived as the condition of nuclear sharing, it might provide the added incentive and dramatic occasion for a readjustment of NATO's over-all military posture and its internal distribution of power, economic burdens and responsibility – a readjustment which is long overdue.

Clearly, to combine such a readjustment with the creation of a NATO nuclear force depends overwhelmingly upon American initiative and active leadership: only the US has the technological means and the political power to resolve inevitable interallied differences. In his press conference Secretary Rusk quite properly observed that this was not "something which we can, ourselves, impose upon others. This is something that has to be a matter of deep consultation and thought among all those involved." But to make American initiative conditional upon the allies formulating concerted, detailed plans would be equivalent to suspending the project indefinitely. Meanwhile, the opportunity for American initiative may pass, as the European allies, individually or perhaps in a grouping around a Franco-German or even an Anglo-Franco-German axis, pursue their own policies independently of the US and of the non-nuclear needs of the alliance as a whole. When one considers the prospect of this development, which would fundamentally alter the whole relationship of the US to Europe and of the European allies to each other and to the Soviet bloc, all the present difficulties besetting the creation of a useful NATO nuclear force would seem to be of secondary importance.

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Madison and the War of 1812

by Sidney Hyman

In February 1826, James Madison, aged 75, wrote an affectionate salute to a dying Thomas Jefferson, aged 83. "I indulge a confidence," said Madison in a retrospect of their lives, "that sufficient evidence will find its way to an other generation to ensure, after we are gone, whatever justice may be withheld whilst we are here. The political horizon is already yielding in your case, at least, the surest augeries of it."

James Madison: Commander in Chief
by Irving Brant
(Bobbs-Merrill; $7.50)

Implied in the phrase "in your case at least," was a fact then plain to both men, Jefferson was already far advanced in being canonized as the first political saint of American democracy. But the "confidence" Madison "indulged," that time would yield a just estimate of his own work, was slow in being confirmed. As the father of the Constitution, his words became arsenals for rival battalions as they waged war in ever changing political contexts. Yet what he was in himself, and what he meant to the building of the American Republic, was held in suspense until the centennial of his birth in 1936.

It was around this time that Irving Brant took Madison's life in his own hands and spent the next 25 years in studying and writing about it. As volume followed volume, each cleared away more of the underbrush of harsh legends and cavalier judgments. Now with this sixth and crucial volume, Mr. Brant's work is at an end. Thanks to his devotion and infinite patience, James Madison has at last received the full act of justice his life warrants.

He was in his twenties, and junior by eight years to Jefferson, when he first emerged on the Virginia scene. He seemed little more than a weapon bearer to Jefferson as the latter captained the social and political revolution in their native state while the Revolutionary War was raging. It was inconceivable to Madison's contemporaries that the relationship in which the pair were first seen, could be changed into a full sharing of command. It was all the more inconceivable that it could be Madison who often led and Jefferson who followed – or at least, that it could be Madison who both provided the common sense, and laid out the tactics by which Jefferson's abstractions could be pressed home as practical political projects.

The sense of Madison's subordination was further heightened in his time by the striking contrast between his own diminutive physical size and Jefferson's great height, along with an equally striking contrast in how they bore themselves in "company." Jefferson spread the contagion of his personal charm on most of those who came within range. Madison was painfully shy and withdrawn. When placed in talkatively "brilliant" company, he even appeared insipid. And from this contrast, contemporaries transmitted the view to later generations that if Madison had any political luster, it was only because he was a moon reflecting Jefferson's sun.

These and similar impressions were effectively disposed of by Mr. Brant in his earlier volumes. He there made it plain, for example, that it was Madison and not Jefferson who first and most clearly saw the American future in terms of a new nation, and not just a league of states. He more clearly saw the need for a Constitutional instrument that could bring the envisioned new Union into existence. He more clearly saw the means for winning acceptance from both the small and the great states – and from all economic interests – to the idea of a government strong at the national center, yet whose parts would be arranged to safeguard individual interests from the tyrannies of majorities and minorities.

Jefferson was in France when the greater part of Madison's constitution-building work was being done. This, as it turned out, was a stroke of historical good fortune. For if the ideas Jefferson conveyed by letter to Madison were adopted, it is doubtful whether any constitution at all could have been agreed upon at the Constitutional Convention, ratified by the states, or if ratified, could have survived. Later still, it was Madison who as a member of the House of Representatives, helped fill in the Constitutional canvas, on which so many aspects of Executive-Legislative relations had been left undefined. Again it was Madison who induced Jefferson to break with Hamilton, and thus prepare the way for a new political party along lines he had previously prophesied in the tenth number of *The Federalist*. And again it was Madison who, as Secretary of State under Jefferson, charted the doctrine of freedom of the seas and the laws of neutrality the world as a whole came to invoke in later years.

Yet when the mass of these practical achievements was placed alongside the generally accepted conclusion that Madison miserably managed the War of 1812, the doleful tone of the latter story beclouded the radiant achievements of Madison's life. Or perhaps it would be more precise to say that men who admired Madison as a political philosopher preferred not to think about the dark underside of his Presidential career, when he and the nation were humiliated by the invading British army that burned Washington.

It is this version of Madison's mismanagement of the War of 1812 that Mr. Brant examines in this final volume of his biography. That he must make out a case in defiance of accepted historical tradition, tends of necessity to invest this volume with the form and air of a lawyer's brief. On behalf of his client, Mr. Brant groups his

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material with an eye toward the calumnies and legends he must expose. Having done so at one point of Madison's imperilled war-time reputation, he then takes on a second point, then a third, and so on.

The heart of the case Mr. Brant makes begins with the agreed upon fact that the War of 1812 was one long disaster, relieved only by a number of eye-opening victories at sea and some solid victories on land when young generals were at last raised to command. He further argues that certain aspects of the war would now appear ludicrous in the extreme. For example, under the force of a higher logic, Britain and the United States continued a thriving trade with each other well into the war before Madison's re-election made it politically safe to stop the trade at the American end. At the same time, American businessmen-patriots, acting through intermediaries, tapped the British money market for funds to finance the war against Britain itself – Congress not being of a mind to levy the necessary taxes.

Mr. Brant then proceeds to argue – and in the main convincingly – that the disasters suffered by American arms were not due to Madison's incompetence as Commander-in-Chief. They were due to the neglect by Congress of its Constitutional duty to raise and support armies – to the cowardice and incompetence of over-age Revolutionary War officers to whom commands had been entrusted – and to the fantastic intrigues of politically ambitious generals. Above all, they were due to the way the New England and Federalists with their commercial interests and allied clergy, rejoiced in every British success, refused to support the American war effort or openly harrassed it, and blatantly preached secession from the Union. By these and other means, they encouraged the Cabinet in Great Britain to delay coming to reasonable peace terms, and to persist in the hope that an avoidable war could be transformed into a war to dismember the Union itself.

In the circumstances, Madison, already taxed by the incompetence or treachery of his senior generals, faced a sectional problem not unlike the one Lincoln later faced. What would otherwise be inexplicable or inexcusable in his conduct of the war becomes understandable when seen in terms of his need to avoid any actions that would throw the disaffected Federalist-dominated areas of the nation into open rebellion against the central authority. In one major respect, however, he differed from Lincoln. Whereas Lincoln suspended civil rights in the name of saving the Union, Madison remained the staunchest guardian of civil rights in the War of 1812 – though massive pretexts to suspend them were provided by the open treason the Federalists preached and practiced at the very time when the Union was in peril of dismemberment by an invading force.

From the purely military standpoint, the paramount devil of the Madison wartime story is the incredible Secretary of War John Armstrong. In page after page Mr. Brant relates how Armstrong repeatedly ignored Madison's soundly based direct orders, how he intervened in situations where he hopelessly confused the chain of command, how he beat a safe retreat from every problematic battle where a firm word could have turned the tide, and how to advance his own Presidential ambitions he engaged in intrigues behind Madison's back with the appointment list of generals.

Mr. Brant reluctantly admits that if Madison is to be blamed for any conspicuous act of wartime negligence, the blame lay in his delay in sensing what manner of man Armstrong was, and having sensed it, to dismiss him. As it was, it took the burning of Washington before Madison politely got rid of Armstrong and replaced him with James Monroe. And while Monroe, on his part, brought a new energy to the War Department, Mr. Brant indicates that he was hardly the great savior of the nation he was thought to be because of his conduct in the war. Having his own ambitions for the Presidency, Monroe carefully edited his letters in ways where he would appear a bold and far-seeing master of military matters. The record of the positions he took in emergencies before becoming Secretary of War directly contradict those he claimed he took.

Next to Madison himself, and next to the American naval figures who defeated the British in two out of every three engagements, the persons ranking highest in Mr. Brant's hierarchy of heroes are the American diplomats at Ghent who won at the diplomatic table what had not been conclusively won on the battlefield. With the brilliant performance of these pioneers to go on, it is difficult to understand why successive generations of Americans were bound to lose their shirt every time they had a diplomatic encounter with foreign powers. In a very real sense, it was these diplomats who not only brought to a victorious end the American War that had begun in 1776, but reached a settlement that allowed the nation to begin in earnest the winning of the Revolution as well. For the continent, after the War of 1812, was opened to expansion of American democracy from ocean to ocean.

It is difficult to convey to the full measure of one's gratitude and respect for the way Mr. Brant has brought a new force and form to the meaning of Madison's life. Thanks to these volumes so spaciously conceived Madison lives again in the full range of his accomplishments.

Sesame

Greet the bestowing sun, the crocus waker.
Greet him who splits the black rock of the dark.
Greet him, the robber of graves, the trumpeter,
the bridegroom, breaker, worker.

Wake and look up at the unlocking sun.
The air is full of keys.
Doors open in the rainy dust
and there's an exit of secrets.

DILYS LAING

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Spiritual Journey, Philosophical Detours

by Robert N. Hertz

Although Mr. Warren calls his latest novel "a Tale of the Civil War," *Wilderness* is no more about the Civil War than *Lady Chatterly's Lover* is about chastity. The reader may even choose to regard that word "Tale" as – well, as a mild instance of poetic license. One could probably call Mr. Warren's book a kind of philosophical parable, featuring as picaresque hero a Bavarian Jew among the American Confederates and Rebels. Adam Rosenzweig is hardly the successor to Tom Jones, but like many other youthful wanderers of fiction Adam doesn't "understand things." Pensive, idealistic, naïve, he commences his education in life by going to America to "fight for freedom." He never does any fighting, although he frets like a practicing metaphysician over the ponderable and imponderable ambiguities of Time, Identity, History, and Life. He *had* to come to the United States, he says. "Because you have to know if there is a truth in the world." The reader is glad for Adam that he achieves this knowledge in, of all places, Virginia – where he came to "find something." What he finds, however, only the most gifted transcendentalist will be able to identify; others may feel that Adam ended with the same elusive "truth" he had at the beginning: the truth which says that man must strive, even if it seems to be only after wind.

Wilderness
by Robert Penn Warren
(Random House; $4.95)

The philosophical detours and near destinations in Adam Rosenzweig's spiritual journey are marked by a series of italicized introspections and "significant" conversations rather than by dramatic and emotionally convincing situations. It is as though Mr. Warren were trying to define as baldly and undistractedly as possible the precise meaning of those concepts in his view of life which have conspicuously popped up here, there, and everywhere throughout his fiction. Mr. Warren's characters are still wondering how to cope with the "awful responsibility of time." Poor Adam gropes with desperate sincerity through this snarled intellectual undergrowth of cosmic twitches and History and Time. But we emerge with him taunted by the temptation, but also distressed by a queasy reluctance, to advise this Adam to go into teaching or something: first, of course, to do lots of reading.

Yet *Wilderness* is thoroughly readable in its brevity, even if our interest is guided mainly by a sort of detached curiosity about the author's own view of life. Like Mr. Christian of Bunyan's narrative, Adam begins his quest with an ideal and a purpose and a dream. His ideal is one of human liberty, and his purpose is to fight for it in spite of a painful, birth-injured foot. For his father had said that there is "no nobler fate for a man than to live and die for human liberty": and Adam lived only in the "dream of his father's life, the father's manhood, the father's heroism." To make his way as a storekeeper's assistant, therefore, among perfidious and self-seeking human vultures on the outskirts of this American war of "liberation" threatens the integrity of Adam's dream and nearly turns to ash his faith in free will.

At first inspired by his two companions' acts of apparently selfless heroism, Adam soon learns to question whether there are any such things as selfless heroism and altruistic impulses. He discovers, for instance, that Jed the storekeeper acknowledges the callous hypocrisy of the one laudable incident of his life. Jed claims to have spoken eloquently in behalf of a condemned Negro only because he was ashamed by his father's sycophancy in a public speech. And the old Negro who saved Adam's life later admits without qualms that his noble salvation was an unpremeditated act of desperation performed out of fear for his own neck. Adam Rosenzweig now wonders if his own life is a desperate deception. He wonders if he has unwittingly entered a battle that his father, at another time and place, never finished. Perhaps he would even get rich in America, if he could. Is man, then, responsible in life for his acts? Or, like Adam's uncle Aaron, do we have no alternative but to "worship" history in all its unregenerate amorality?

Adam often remembers the cynical taunts of his grubby and avaricious fellow passengers during their trip from the Old Country, and he is troubled by Jed's question, "Is anybody free?" Nevertheless, Adam struggles for an unequivocal conviction: "I am moving down this road," he says, "because I believe." The road is circuitous and dusty, and what Adam believes somehow escapes clarification in his terse but terribly important (and frequently italicized) reflections. Adam's touching confusions and very genuine anguish are often distilled into portentous stream-of-consciousness "asides," bloated rhetoric and endlessly solemn observations of presumably "universal" (though usually quite esoteric) import. In fiction, we expect to know how a character *feels* upon waking in a plush bedroom in a strange country; we want to share his first perceptions of the place, and to listen in on credible and informative dialogue. But Adam hardly gets his eyes open before he decides that he has "seized upon the concept of Time." Ten minutes later, though Uncle Aaron has been absent for decades from Bavaria, he is already lecturing his nephew that history is "merely the agony people have to go through so that things will turn out as they would have turned out anyway."

Adam and Uncle Aaron and the rest don't offend us as people, however, as long as we are led to believe that Mr. Warren is out to present in a fairly systematic way a tightly coherent philosophical position. Disappointment does not entirely supercede this expectation until the end of the book. Adam finally kills a man, after which he happily assumes that "that is why I crossed the ocean and came all those miles. To do that." His purpose identified, and a presumably self-determined act accomplished, he feels the exaltation of having discovered a "great secret." "He knew . . . that he would have to try to know what a man must know to be a man. He knew that he would have to try to know that the truth is unbetrayable, and that only the betrayer is ever betrayed, and then only by betraying." Ah, wilderness.

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

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Romanticism and the Modern Ego

by Victor Lange

Mr. Barzun's book, which first appeared some twenty years ago under the title: *Romanticism and the Modern Ego* and is now reissued with a new concluding chapter, is not merely a defense of the romantic sensibility but a magnificent philippic against the perverters of those immensely influential beginnings of the modern intellectual temper. In 1943 the book offered, first of all, a long-needed attempt at terminological housecleaning: it exposed the various platitudinous uses of the term "romantic" and defined the context within which romanticism must be seen. As one of our ablest cultural historians, Mr. Barzun sought to provide the sober perspectives of historical judgment that would enable us to salvage from an onrushing wave of intellectual confusion, whatever strength there lay in the beginnings of our "modern" experience.

Classic, Romantic and Modern
by Jacques Barzun
(Little, Brown; $5)

"What I am about to discuss," he begins, "is not some vague literary and emotional outlook known as Romantic, but the meaning of a whole age as seen against the background of its close predecessor by yet a third age – our own." In his specific account of the historical topography of Romanticism, Mr. Barzun properly deplores and corrects the perversion which the political views of Rousseau and Burke have suffered from the hands of their exaggerators and false disciples, their views of individualism and tyranny, and the inevitable ambiguity in romantic political thinking of the terms liberal and conservative. The chief romantic premise, he insists, was the desire to create a new society, different from its immediate forerunner. As against the classical faith in stability within known and defined limits, the romantic is dedicated to the acceptance and exploration of an open universe: reason, nature and feeling may be terms common to both attitudes, but through the romantic revolution Mr. Barzun rightly shows them to have been reappraised in the light of new biological insights. Romantic art and romantic life are the two areas in which the fresh sense of the concrete, the particular and the energetic is demonstrated in some detail: the romantic life, Mr. Barzun argues, was robust and productive, largely because the romanticists were stimulated, pressed onward, justified by extraordinary events and by the challenges of political, social and aesthetic issues that transcended their personal selves.

It is in his chapter on "The Four Phases of Romanticism" that Mr. Barzun develops his thesis of the comprehensive and consequential nature of the romantic revolution and its unfolding in the subsequent movements of Realism, Symbolism and Naturalism. Each of these -isms proceeded on the assumption that its romantic antecedents had failed to fulfil their intellectual and social promises. The chief purpose of the present essay is to put forth a sharply focused and insistent plea for a consideration of the waste in our time of intellectual energies and the breakdown of the cultural impulses which the last century has provided.

What could – in 1943 – be described as "Modernism" and what seems today a phase of our history that has been superseded even more ominously by a still more violent disavowal of the creative impulses of the 19th Century, appears in Mr. Barzun's final pages as a series of reminders of our spiritual bankruptcy. "The modern ego," he writes, "begins its career with self-contempt, and it expresses scorn by a violent, and indeed hostile, obtruding of the ordinary;" it seems to be walking forward with its head turned back in fear and longing." After a brief period of cultural effervescence in the ten years before the First World War – the era of socialism, internationalism and futurism – twenty subsequent years of disillusionment, self-distrust and futile promises of new realisms have destroyed the heritage of romanticism in violence and confusion.

From this harsh but passionate condemnation of the contemporary failure of nerve and imagination, Mr. Barzun does not detract one iota in his concluding "Epilogue: Romanticism in 1960." Whatever hope there may have been in the stirring of the individual and social conscience immediately after the Second World War, its cruel effect has been to ensure "the elimination not alone of Romanticist art and its sequels, but of all high art of the last five centuries." Mr. Barzun here echoes the chief thesis of his book *The Energies* of Art (1956) in which he described the "abolitionist" character of our present art, the intention no longer merely to shelve the past but to erase it, and by doing this to reproduce in man a wholly new consciousness. The divorce of the "act" of creating from mind and all remembered ideas has resulted in an aesthetics of annihilation. With its dislike and distrust of ideas, the substitution of sensation for strong emotion, and the taking refuge from aesthetic understanding in the intricacies of technique, modern art has deprived itself of all possible effectiveness. The single achievement of Cubism "the most productive, the purest and strongest of all the movements of this century" has been altogether forgotten or denied. There remains only the melancholy certainty that the philosophy of absolute denial which Mr. Barzun recognizes in our contemporary culture will produce a void in which the true impulses of the tradition described so brilliantly and urgently in this essay, may be remembered; for "alternately dominant and submerged, romanticism seems to be a permanent trait of Western man. It expresses and exalts his energetic, creative, expansive tendencies by recognizing that, although he is but a feeble creature lost in the universe, he has unpredictable powers that develop under stress of desire and risk."

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sidney Hyman's *new book*, Eisenhower: Promise and Performance, *will be published next spring.* Dilys Laing's *poem is one of the last that she wrote before her death in 1960.* Victor Lange *is on the German faculty at Princeton.*

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ART

More Lavish Christmas Art Books

As noted last spring, the Skira invasion of the gorgeous East produces color in several ways more satisfactory than that of the firm's long list of books on Western painting. The new volume in "Treasures of Asia" is *Japanese Painting*, by the Tokyo scholar Akiyama Terukazu (Skira, $22.50). As with James Cahill's *Chinese Painting*, the immediate visual impression is that the reproductions are closer to the originals than anything in the list from *Lascaux* to the monographs on the 20th Century French. The most obvious reason is the tremendous differences in the quality of paint used in the originals. The Chinese and now the Japanese art reproduced is all much more like ink in texture than anything except water color on paper in Western art, and Skira has never wasted much time on Western water colors. The Oriental painters, in fact, did use water color and even ink, and printer's ink, expertly blended, can come very close. Secondly, the old firm apparently feels less impelled to compensate for the lushness of oil paint by souping up the inks with varnish. The Skira sheen is completely absent. Even in the many plates using gold, the brilliance is toned down to approximate the delicate use of gold in the originals. Needless to say, 81 reproductions do not really cover the fifteen or so centuries of the subject, but they do give the high points and the text is a readable, orderly survey.

Less satisfactory as regards color is the new addition to the Abrams museum series in the small, thick format, *The Hermitage Museum, Leningrad*, by Pierre Descargues (Abrams, $7.50). As there too often is in this series, there's a tendency toward blue in many of the 127 color plates. Nevertheless, with those plates and with another 200 small size black and whites, the reader gets a fair look at the institution. As in the others of the series, the text begins with an essay on the museum, then goes into individual commentaries on the plates. Neither the book nor the museum is really a key to Russian taste, imperial or Soviet: the empress and the commissars alike took whatever was left lying around; but it is good to be reminded that Russia has always contained people and rulers able to look to the West. More important, it is good to fill in some of the gaps in the knowledge of most of us about painting from Simone Martini through early Cubism. That there is nothing later probably means chiefly that it's hard to start buying what you're used to getting free.

In all the flood of literature on Van Gogh, the new selection of his letters by W. H. Auden, *Van Gogh, A Self-Portrait* (New York Graphic, $10) stands out because it emphasizes the fact, so regularly lost sight of, that the man regarded himself as a professional painter, was interested in learning everything he could about his craft and was constantly critical – that is, alert – about the art of himself and others. Auden has chosen from the complete, three volume edition, those letters in which Vincent writes about painting. We get his thoughts on his art, his notions about how it can best be pursued. This is a far remove from the romantic figure driven by winds of the spirit he knew not where. There are eight color plates and 24 drawings integrated with the letters.

In the field of the relatively low priced art book, Phaidon continues to hold its lead over all competition. Two new additions maintain the standard and justify the format. *Botticelli* with an introduction by Lionello Venturi, and *Cézanne*, with an introduction by Fritz Novotny (Phaidon, $5.95 each) use the 9 by 12 inch page for 50 plates of excellent color. Details in this size can approximate a hunk of the original canvas or wall, so that you do at least get reminders that the works are paintings as well as pictures.

The rarest bird in the aviary of art books is the development of a theme through the paintings of a period – and by "theme" I do not mean the theme of a certain kind of painting or the theme that artists are great men. We are most used to this kind of work in the books that come from the Bollingen lectures in the National Gallery. Here's another: *The Earthly Paradise: Art in the Nineteenth Century*, by Werner Hofmann (Braziller, $25). That century is most often dealt with as the background to the Impressionists, their forerunners and successors. Dr. Hofmann, for a change, considers the art of the time as a whole, just as we customarily do with ancient bodies of art. Thus many artists normally ignored are placed side by side with the main current from Goya to Gauguin and their work is examined from the point of view of the developing mind of modern man. An extremely provocative performance.

At the other end of the scale in terms of ambition is the *Tudor History of Painting* edited by Robert Maillard (Tudor, $10). It has 1,000 – count 'em – color reproductions, each from about twice to three times the size of a large-size postage stamp. The color is pretty hopeless, but still a decent look gets through and the text, by many hands, does cover the ground.

Probably the best book of a single painter of the season is *Henri Rousseau* by Jean Bouret (N. Y. Graphic, $25). There is a real effort to track down many of the disputed canvases; you may still disagree, but the material is there to judge for yourself. Color is excellent; the text, occasionally a touch too personal, is a good summary of the man and his work. In addition to the 50 in color, there are almost 200 in fine black and white.

Rousseau, however, is known. The most interesting artist to be – for all



Are we compromising with murder?

Yes, answers James Avery Joyce, international lawyer and sociologist who has worked on humanitarian projects connected with the United Nations.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
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practical purposes – introduced to a wider American public through art book publishing this year is *M. C. Escher* (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, $6.50). Escher is a printmaker and an extremely talented one, but the real talent here is draughtsmanship in the service of ingenuity. Neither of these, especially the latter, is highly thought of, but Escher raises both to the level of art. I try to keep up with prints, attending the big shows and a lot of the small ones, but I'd never heard of Escher until about a year ago on a visit to Jenkintown, Pa., where Lessing Rosenwald's print cabinet had some on view and many more on tap. Escher devotes himself to trickery and illusion. He draws interlocking figures of fish and bird; he draws impossible, yet completely convincing perspective scenes in which you get utterly baffled, not knowing, finally, which way is up; he modulates, in mid-drawing, from line to shaded rendering; and he distorts with mathematical precision. The ingenuity is medieval, relating to many of the more light-hearted manuscript decorations, but the space-time assumptions are pure Einstein. Give yourself a treat for Christmas and get to know this work. FRANK GETLEIN

MOVIES

French Novels into French Pastries

Gratitude to Roger Vadim for making one thing clear. Of all literary forms, the epistolary novel is one of the most suitable for film adaptation. It consists, usually, of a series of short scenes, with varying subjective viewpoints, with a whole work built on juxtaposition of different aspects of the same events. It is the one novel-form composed, like a film, of short "takes," with its rhythm nicely controllable by the length of each segment and its serial placement.

Les Liaisons Dangereuses (Astor)
Zazie (Nouvelles Editions de Films)

Laclos' *Les Liaisons Dangereuses* seems an ideal choice. It has a motile plot, ruthlessly realized characters, it carves out truth with a psychologically keen razor. And its arena is sexual intrigue. It is one of those French novels, like Constant's *Adolphe*, which remind us that emotional candor in art is more a matter of cycles than of steady historical progress.

All this obviously occurred to Vadim, a French director, who made the adaptation with Roger Vailland and Claude Brule. Commendably, they have tried to keep the Laclos effect of juxtaposing an act and the true feeling about the act, and have even retained vestiges of the epistolary form by leading some scenes in and out of the reading of letters describing them. But they have committed a basic mistake. They have modernized the story, using current Parisian high society instead of 18th-Century aristocratic society, chic apartments and skiing resorts instead of *petites maisons* and chateaux. The changes are moderately clever but fundamentally doomed because the late 18th Century was not the mid-20th.

Laclos' novel is the masterpiece of the so-called libertine tradition: the age of reason gone somewhat overripe, at least in the field of sexual relations, where arrangements and combinations were worked out like chess problems and where seductions were planned for the *frisson* of corruption, not out of desire. It was the deer park of a select group entirely divorced from the world's currents and responsibilities, where laboratory experiments in sensation could be conducted dispassionately.

There is no such society, however wealthy or privileged, in our time. *La dolcissima vita* is saturated with implicit or explicit *Angst*. Vadim & Co. tip their hands at once by marrying the arch-immoralists Valmont and the Marquise de Merteuil, instead of leaving them ex-lovers abetting each other's further seductions as they look forward to a return engagement of champions; and by making Valmont a member of the French Foreign Office eager for a UN appointment! These touches, and others like them, transform the ambience from whole-souled, sheer sensualism to conscious sinning.

Thus the adaptation fails because Laclos' characters do not transpose successfully in all their pristine impurity; and because these members of an elegantly special society cannot be dragooned into representing the moral climate of any contemporary society. The adaptors must have sensed something of this failure: they have tried to compensate here and there by making the film comic. (The novel is comic only in irony.) But all this does is to make the several unhappy endings seem didactically moral. In the novel the unhappy endings are as probable a part of life as the seductions; one wins and therefore one also possibly loses.

Vadim's direction, too, gropes for a style and reveals his dependence on imitation. (The camera tilts, of course, when Marianne goes mad.) He has one accomplishment: he knows how to photograph a nude woman without completely revealing her nudity. He practised it with his first wife, Brigitte Bardot, and he perfects it with his present wife, Annette Vadim. But then the lady has few other qualifications for being on the screen.

Gerard Philipe, as Valmont in the last film of his life, has the right fake tearful sincerity but lacks a hard self-seeking core. Jeanne Moreau, as his wife, although interesting, makes too forthright an emotional statement to be credible as an adventuress who enjoys her husband's conquests. Jeanne Valerie, as Cecile, has appeal, although Laclos would have thought her four or five years too old. (The Marquise writes to Cecile when the latter complains of seduction: "Seriously, is it possible at past fifteen years of age to be as much of a child as you are?")

This film was refused an export license for several years by the French government, presumably because they feared it would reflect adversely on France. Anyone who could take *Les Liaisons Dangereuses* as seriously as that is past protection anyway.

Another French movie, *Zazie*, also attempts to reproduce a novel. Raymond

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Queneau's recent book is a piece of sometimes funny *bizarrerie* about an uninhibited 11-year-old girl brought to Paris for a week-end by her mother who is then busy with a lover and leaves the child with an uncle – a night-club female impersonator. The child proceeds to raise hell among a group of people who are far from staid citizens.

The film was directed by Louis Malle who made *The Lovers*, which, though foolish, showed flair; and *Frantic*, a commonplace thriller. In *Zazie* Malle has not tried to duplicate Queneau's barmy style, he has tried to find its cinematic equivalent. What he has chosen is silent-film comedy, so we get an anthology of gags from Keaton, Langdon, Harold Lloyd, *et al.* Example: A chases B; they run behind a billboard; when they emerge, B is chasing A. But in the old comedies all the foofaraw was to some plot purpose, however thin; here there is none, just a long collection of gags which, because they exist in a vacuum, soon become tiresome. Worse, a feeling of coterie preciousness envelops the film. One can almost hear the voices of Malle's friends cooing on the soundtrack: "Oh, Louis, how delicious!"

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

A Communication

Why Castro Can't Be Neutral

Sirs:

I am astounded by the liberties which Ernst Halperin has permitted himself to take in his interpretation of recent Cuban events. His most recent article, *Why Castro Can't Be Neutral* (November 27) calls for some questioning.

"We know," he writes, that Khrushchev hoped for "a neutral Popular Front regime under Castro." How do we "know" it? Presumably Mr. Halperin heard stories to this effect in Havana. But is this equivalent to *knowledge* – indeed, Mr. Halperin writes as if it were common knowledge – of the innermost dealings between Khrushchev and Castro? I do not think that he should take so much for granted. I think he should tell us not merely how "we know" but how he knows.

But the plot thickens. We are also assured that "militants within the *Partido Socialista Popular*, like Blas Roca" staged a rebellion against Khrushchev by initiating and pushing through the organization of the so-called united party. According to Halperin's version, Khrushchev "tacitly backed a moderate splinter group within the Cuban Communist Party which urged a Popular Front, headed by Castro and including not only the Communists but other parties." But the pro-Khrushchev "splinter group" was allegedly defeated, and Blas Roca won out.

Again, Mr. Halperin does not offer a shred of objective or any other kind of evidence for this story. Blas Roca is not merely a "militant" in the PSP, the official Cuban Communist Party. He happens to be the General Secretary and has been since 1934. He is a product of the Stalinist School of Communist leadership, which means that he was tested innumerable times for his subservience and utter loyalty to the Soviet party. There is not a single case on record in which he ever flinched from following every twist and turn of Soviet policy.

Moreover, it was not as a mere individual "militant" that Blas Roca came out for the proposal of the "fusion" of all revolutionary Cuban forces "in a single movement." He did so in his main report to the Eighth National Congress of the PSP in August, 1960. He spoke not in his own name but as always, on such occasions, as the voice of the entire top leadership. There was no peep of opposition or criticism from any other quarter. We must also assume, then, that the Cuban top leadership in its overwhelming majority joined Blas Roca in the rebellion against Khrushchev, who was so isolated and humiliated that he was constrained to back a "splinter group." I think it is incumbent on Mr. Halperin to tell us something more about this "splinter group." Who represents it?

Not only does Mr. Halperin tell us very little but some of what he tells us is not very convincing. What are we to make of his allusion that Khrushchev's "moderate splinter group" wanted a "Popular Front" including the Communists and "other parties"? Unfortunately, there have been no other parties in Cuba since early in 1959. Mr. Halperin himself refers somewhat contradictorily to the "unorganized '26th of July' party." An unorganized party is hardly a party and, indeed, the 26th of July Movement never called itself a "party." Long ago in 1959, Castro made the decision to prevent it from becoming a party. It is hard to imagine any Communist splinter group so unfamiliar with the Cuban political reality that it would urge, presumably in 1960, a "Popular Front" between the Communists and "other parties." It is even harder to imagine Khrushchev and his multitudinous representatives on the scene falling for this kind of political fantasy.

But this is not the whole story. Mr. Halperin's real revelation is that Fidel Castro has thrown in his lot with the militant "Chinese Communists against the cautious Khrushchev." This is supposed to explain why Castro decided to join Blas Roca's rebellion against the Russian Communists and go along with the new party. In defiance of Khrushchev, then, we are told: "Just before the invasion last April Castro finally abandoned neutralism, declaring his 'socialist' revolution."

There is no doubt that Castro declared his "socialist" revolution just before the April invasion, but did he abandon "neutrality"? How could he "abandon" what he never was? Fidel stopped making "neutral" statements about the United States in the summer of 1959, and they steadily reached a crescendo of "unneutrality" until the summer of 1960, when they could go no farther. Castro's abandonment of "neutrality" in April, 1961, is sheer mythology.

Mr. Halperin seems to think that it took some audacity on Blas Roca's part to advocate a new "united party" as successor of the Communist PSP. But what if the "united party" is merely the PSP writ large? The ORI (Integrated Revolutionary Organizations), which is preparing the way for the promised PURS (United Party of the Socialist Revolution) is a Communist Party in everything but name, as was the PSP incidentally. In Prague on October 25, 1961, Antonio Núñez Jiménez declared that the PURS "will be a Marxist-Leninist party, based on the principles of democratic centralism"

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(*Revolución*, October 25, 1961). The cadre of the PSP has become bodily the cadre of the ORI with the addition of the top Fidelistas who, in this way, could enter a Communist party without being forced to defend the dubious record of the PSP which had, after all, six or seven years of intimate alliance and partnership with Batista. For some time now, Fidel Castro has been making speeches avowing his Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, the most recent being the exceptionally important one in *Revolución* of November 11, 1961. The Communist Party of Cuba changed its name to *Unión Revolucionaria Comunista* in 1940 in a maneuver to enlarge itself, and it rebaptized itself as the *Partido Socialista Popular* in 1944 in another tactical move. The ORI or PURS will be its fourth incarnation, but why should that be made to appear such a departure from precedent?

And what evidence is there that Fidel Castro has chosen Peking against Moscow? Fidel still makes many speeches, and he has taken to inserting in them homages to Lenin, to the Russian Revolution and to Soviet strength. But he never as much as mentions Mao or the Chinese example. The entire Cuban economy now depends for its survival on the Soviet bloc, with the Chinese contributing relatively little. If Fidel broke with Moscow, he would invite civil war in his own ranks and economic disaster from which the Chinese could not possibly save him. Yet, if Mr. Halperin is right, he has signalled to Moscow that he is a partisan of Peking. The logic of the situation makes this so improbable that some hard evidence is obviously needed to make Mr. Halperin's thesis convincing. Yet such hard evidence as there is, is all on the other side.

For example, let us take the handling of the recent 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in the Cuban organ, *Revolución*. The issue of October 20, 1961, carried pages of Khrushchev's full speech with banner headlines on the first and other pages. Chou En-lai's rejoinder was also published in full, but inconspicuously on an inside page under a one-column head: "Speech of Chou En-lai." Three and a half pages of Khrushchev's final speech was published in the issue of November 1, 1961. Except for Chou's first and last statement at the congress, no reader of *Revolución* would know what the Albanians and Chinese have been saying since then. The anti-Soviet side of the controversy has been carefully kept out of the Cuban press.

But the cream of the jest is still to come. Blas Roca headed the Cuban delegation of five to the Soviet congress in the name of the ORI, which, of course, confirmed the understanding that it was just another version of the Communist party. In his speech at the congress, according to the text in *Pravda* of October 23, 1961, p. 9, Blas Roca lined up unconditionally with the Russians against the Albanians and thus, inferentially, against the Chinese. He joined in the denunciation of "revisionism and dogmatism," the current Soviet ideological stigmata for the Yugoslavs and Chinese. Then he declared: "We, in full accord with our conviction and experience, firmly support the position set forth by Comrade Khrushchev with respect to the negative actions of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor." At the conclusion of Blas Roca's speech, Khrushchev cried out, among other things: "Hail the Cuban delegation headed by Comrade Blas Roca!" In addition, Blas Roca was permitted to make a well-publicized speech in a Soviet factory, and he was commissioned to conclude some agreements with the Soviet Union on the sugar trade.

And this is the same Blas Roca who, Mr. Halperin assures us, "appalled" the Russians over a year ago with his policy of uniting Castro's 26th of July movement with the Cuban Communist party and succeeded in putting it over against Khrushchev's opposition and backing, tacit or otherwise, of an anti-Blas Roca "splinter group." This is the Blas Roca who, with the help of Fidel Castro, forced Khrushchev's Russia to suffer a "bitter setback" in Cuba. This is the Blas Roca who, according to Mr. Halperin, has been giving aid and comfort to the Chinese Communists.

Obviously the pieces do not fit, or if Mr. Halperin is going to make them fit, he must do some tall explaining to explain away the peculiar behavior of Blas Roca and Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd congress. Is it usual for the Russian leadership to reward faithless servitors with their warmest displays

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of confidence and affection (Blas Roca was placed next to Ho Chi Minh who was next to Khrushchev at the November 7 celebration!)? Is it plausible to suppose that, after three decades of uninterrupted loyalty to the Russian leadership, Blas Roca should have jumped over to the Chinese and back to the Russians in the space of a single year? It strikes me that Mr. Halperin would have done much better to have chosen Che Guevara as his pro-Chinese protagonist; Che, at least, did not have so many years of Russian schooling in Communist politics.

It is not my intention to scoff at speculations about different tendencies and personal rivalries in Castro's regime and high command. There is nothing surprising in the supposition that the private sympathies of one Cuban leader or another may go out to the Chinese Communists. It may be assumed that the Chinese and Russian Communists have carried on some kind of competition in Cuba, though it seems more likely that the Cuban leaders would like to stay out of the Russo-Chinese controversy if they can. The changes in Cuba have been so furious and drastic that there is no reason to expect a tidy and harmonious ruling family. I am quite ready to believe that the Russians are having more trouble with Fidel's ego than they have with, say, Ulbricht's, that Cuba has become for them a very expensive diversionary operation, and that it is hazardous to predict the future course of this relationship. But Mr. Halperin has gone far beyond the permissible limits of speculation and hearsay.

Theodore Draper
New York, New York

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